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The Utility of a Nonconsequentialist Rationale 
for Civil-Jury-Awarded Punitive Damages 
Paul J. Zwier* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Jury-awarded punitive damages are a controversial political and 
social issue.  To some, high punitive damage awards are a sign that our 
civil justice system needs reform.  To others, these awards are the key to 
taming international corporate greed.  The justification for punitive 
damages in civil cases has continued to oscillate between a 
consequentialist1 and a nonconsequentialist rationale.2  This fluctuation 
in the rationale for punitive damages is nothing new.  Since the 
Reformation, shifts between uses of the law have undergirded civil law 
in its struggle to replace the unified, hierarchical nature of canon law and 
to justify itself in both the modern and post-modern eras.3  This same 
oscillation in rationales has surfaced concerning punishment in the 
criminal justice system.4  The debate concerning the uses of law in moral 
                                                     
 *  Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. 
 1. The consequentualist rationale is sometimes called the utilitarian rationale or the deterrence 
rationale. 
 2. The nonconsequentialist rational is sometimes called the deontological rationale or the 
retribution rationale. 
 3. John Witte sees three rationales for, or uses of, law in the Lutheran reformation of canon 
law: 
Each of our three writers, [the Lutheran reformers Melanchthon, Eisermann, and 
Oldendorp,] pressed the uses of doctrine to further specific applications [of law].  
Melanchthon applied the three uses of the law to differentiate and define the three 
purposes of criminal law and punishment.  In his view, the civil use of the law 
corresponded to criminal deterrence.  The theological use of the law corresponded to 
criminal retribution.  The educational use of the law corresponded to criminal 
rehabilitation. 
JOHN WITTE, JR., LAW AND PROTESTANTISM: THE LEGAL TEACHINGS OF THE LUTHERAN 
REFORMATION 171 (2002).  As opposed to Melanchthon, I will argue that in civil law punitive 
damages should serve a retributive function. 
 4. See generally John E. Witte, Jr. & Thomas C. Arthur, The Three Uses of the Law: A 
Protestant Source of the Purposes of Criminal Punishment?, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 433 (1993–94); see 
also Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. 
L. REV. 843, 862 (2002) (arguing that punishment of the innocent as a means to deter others is the 
worst utilitarianism extreme); John Collins Coffee, Jr., Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-
Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 419, 419 (1980) 
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philosophy is important to the discovery of the normative differences 
between criminal punishment and civil punishment.  It highlights the 
purpose of punishing intentional corporate misconduct in the civil arena.  
Using moral philosophy and criminal justice literature, this Article 
critiques the Supreme Court’s struggle to define the rationale for punitive 
damages.  In addition, this Article shows the continuing utility of using 
retribution as a factor in punitive damages and discusses the harm the 
Court inflicts by minimizing the retributive justification and usurping the 
discretion of the jury. 
Since the late 1970s, the convergence of law and economics has 
garnered increased popularity in the tort arena.5  Its proponents claim the 
consequentialist ethic is superior to the corrective justice norms of 
traditional negligence analysis.6  In reality, deterrence models are as 
subjective and as dependent on individual beliefs and biases as are the 
corrective justice norms of traditional negligence analysis.  Despite this 
reality, the law and economics ethic continues to dominate the discussion 
and to serve as the driving force behind tort reform.  This ethic is evident 
in the Supreme Court’s recent due process analysis of punitive damages.  
In a recent holding on the subject, the Court, although claiming a 
continued role for retribution, restricted the jury’s ability to effectuate 
punishment for egregious behavior by suggesting that appellate courts 
limit punitive damages to a single-digit multiple of compensatory 
damages.7  In so doing, the Court backhandedly endorsed the law and 
economics, or deterrence, model of punishment and ignored the broader 
effects on social norms and values that result from taking the retribution 
analysis out of the hands of a common law jury. 
                                                                                                                       
(arguing that fines are an inefficient means by which to deter organizational crimes); Richard A. 
Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 410 (1980) 
(arguing that a sufficiently large fine is an equally effective deterrent that is cheaper to administer 
and preferable); Aaron J. Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical Premises of 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557, 561 (2003) (arguing that the philosophy of 
punishment in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines should be consequentialist); Paul H. Robinson & 
John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 456 (1997) (arguing that shared 
democratic values support a “just desert” rationale of punishment, rather than morality). 
 5. See e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 29–52 (1972) 
[hereinafter Posner, Theory] (discussing the negligence system in terms of law and economics); 
Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 106 (1979) 
[hereinafter Posner, Utilitarianism] (explaining that economic analysis was, at the time, a preferred 
basis of legal theory over utilitarianism). 
 6. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 869, 890–91 (1998) (“[E]xtra compensatory damages may be needed for deterrence 
purposes in circumstances in which [a defendant’s behavior] would not call for punishment.”). 
 7. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (explaining that 
although ratios are not binding, “[s]ingle-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due 
process, while still achieving . . . deterrence and retribution”). 
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The Court’s recent pronouncements regarding jurisdictional evidence 
restrictions and single-digit ratio caps endorse the consequentialist 
justification for punitive damages and seriously curtail the function of 
retribution in civil law punishment.  In addition, the Court has called into 
question the jury’s ability to properly apply the factors enumerated in 
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,8 for determining the proper amount 
of punitive damages.  By establishing de novo review, the Court 
expanded the discretion of appellate courts, which raises important 
questions, such as whether appellate courts are better equipped to 
determine damages, whether judges are more political and, therefore, 
more influenced by extrinsic forces, and whether these new restrictions 
ultimately will harm consumers and destroy the integrity of the American 
market.  Only time will tell, but in this struggling economy that relies so 
heavily on the confidence of consumers, investors, and trade partners 
(both foreign and domestic), can we afford to wait and see? 
Part II of this Article examines the Supreme Court’s modern punitive 
damages jurisprudence and highlights its gradual shift to a 
consequentualist justification.  Part III explores the ethical distinction 
between consequentualism and nonconsequentualism and argues that a 
purely consequentualist scheme ultimately will degrade the values and 
benefits of a more mixed system.  This ethical distinction is vital to an 
understanding of why we need citizens influenced by morality, equity, 
sympathy, and society to mete out civil punishments in the way of 
punitive damages, as opposed to so-called “rational” processes using an 
inflexible formula.  This Article argues that a punitive damages award 
based on the utilitarian, deterrence model, determined by some judicially 
created cap, is no more rational than a decision by a jury.  In Part IV, 
having established that the jury should be given broad discretion, this 
Article explores a nonconsequentialist defense of punitive damages.  In 
the process, this Article shows the underlying social norms and beliefs 
that support the return of jury-made punitive damages decisions. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S MOVE TO A CONSEQUENTIALIST/ 
DETERRENCE ETHIC FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
In 1989, the Supreme Court decided, in Browning-Ferris Industries, 
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., that civil punitive damages were not subject 
to the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment constraints9 
                                                     
 8. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).  See also infra text accompanying notes 18–31. 
 9. 492 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1989). 
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and thus implied that punitive damages were not about punishment and 
retribution.  The Court found the case law against applying the Eighth 
Amendment to punitive damages to be overwhelming.10  However, the 
majority opinion did not reject a retributive rationale.  The concurring 
and dissenting Justices (Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and O’Connor) 
struggled to describe the meaning of punitive damages in a civil context.  
The best Justices O’Connor and Stevens offered was a description 
providing a mixed rationale: deterring future bad actors and also 
expressing moral outrage at what had been done to the plaintiffs and to 
society when the defendant chose its course of action.11 
In Browning-Ferris, the Court did not address due process issues 
because the defendant failed to raise due process arguments at both the 
trial and appellate levels.12  In their concurring opinion, Justices Brennan 
and Marshall signaled their due process concerns.13  Justices O’Connor 
and Scalia had earlier expressed due process concerns in Bankers Life 
and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw.14  Furthermore, because Chief Justice 
Rehnquist opposed large punitive damages in an even earlier case, Smith 
v. Wade,15 it was not a question of whether but rather when and how 
these due process concerns would appear in the Court’s future opinions. 
In 1996, the Court decided that due process required limiting 
punitive damages.  In three landmark cases, the Court held that the old 
common law standard—that punitive awards should be overturned only 
if “grossly excessive”16 and “unsupportable by the evidence”17—
provided appellate courts with insufficient reviewing power.  The Court 
 
                                                     
 10. See id. at 262 (“[O]ur cases long have understood [the Eighth Amendment] to apply 
primarily, and perhaps exclusively, to criminal pro se citations and punishments.”).  The Court went 
on to state as follows: 
To decide the instant case, however, we need not go so far as to hold that the Excessive 
Fines Clause applies just to criminal cases.  Whatever the outer confines of the Clause’s 
reach may be, we now decide only that it does not constrain an award of money damages 
in a civil suit when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to 
receive a share of the damages awarded.  To hold otherwise, we believe, would be to 
ignore the purposes and concerns of the Amendment, as illuminated by its history. 
Id. at 263–64. 
 11. See id. at 292–93 (O’Connor, J. & Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the historical 
emergence of punitive damages). 
 12. Id. at 276–77 (majority opinion). 
 13. Id. at 281–82 (Brennan, J. & Marshall, J., concurring). 
 14. 486 U.S. 71, 86 (1988) (O’Connor, J. & Scalia, J., concurring).  See generally Forrest 
Campbell, Comment, Bankers Life: Justice O’Connor’s Solution to the Jury’s Standardless 
Discretion to Award Punitive Damages, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719 (1989). 
 15. 461 U.S. 30, 87–88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 16. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993). 
 17. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 708 (1989). 
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concluded that due process required trial judges and appellate courts to 
review and, in some cases, curtail the size of punitive damage awards. 
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore18 prompted this “new and 
improved” due process review.  The plaintiff in the initial suit, Dr. Ira 
Gore, Jr., purchased a “new” car from his local BMW dealer.19  What 
Gore did not know was that the car had been damaged by acid rain.20  To 
save $4000, the decrease in the resale value resulting from the damage,21 
BMW repainted and sold the car without disclosing the repair.22  For this 
infraction, the jury awarded the plaintiffs $4 million in punitive 
damages.23  Noticing the discrepancy between the compensatory and 
punitive amounts, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced the award to $2 
million.24 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the award was grossly 
excessive and remanded the case to be decided consistent with its 
opinion.25  The Court instructed future courts to consider the following 
three factors when reviewing punitive damages: (1) the reprehensibility 
of the defendant’s conduct,26 (2) the ratio of punitive damages to the 
actual harm suffered,27 and (3) the comparison between punitive 
damages and the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for 
comparable conduct.28 
The last two factors were new and seemed to favor defendants.  The 
Court compared the punitive damage award in Gore with statutory fines 
for consumer fraud.29  Not surprisingly, the punitive damage award was 
far higher.30  However, the Court ignored any incarceration that might 
have been imposed if an individual were found guilty of fraud.  The 
Court also reasoned that the Alabama court’s consideration of conduct 
and injuries outside of Alabama, where other states might not find 
BMW’s conduct unlawful, was unfair and violated due process.31 
                                                     
 18. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 19. Id. at 562. 
 20. Id. at 563. 
 21. Id. at 564. 
 22. Id. at 563–64. 
 23. Id. at 565.  The jury heard evidence that 983 purchasers had been defrauded to the tune of 
$4000 per car, or approximately $4 million total.  Id. at 564. 
 24. Id. at 567. 
 25. Id. at 586. 
 26. Id. at 575. 
 27. Id. at 583. 
 28. Id. at 580–81. 
 29. Id. at 584. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 572–73.  The Court seemed persuaded that BMW’s conduct was not reprehensible 
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Gore was not the Court’s last word on punitive damages.  In Cooper 
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,32 the Court determined 
that punitive damages would no longer be a question of fact left to the 
jury.  The jury in Cooper found, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
the defendant, Cooper, acted with malice, recklessness, and outrageous 
indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm when it passed off a 
Leatherman Tool’s product as its own.33  The jury awarded the plaintiff 
$50,000 in compensatory damages and $4.5 million in punitive 
damages.34  On appeal, the Court remanded the punitive damage award.35  
In the face of two centuries of common law to the contrary, the Court 
declared that punitive damage awards were questions of law, not fact, 
and should be reviewed de novo, rather than under an abuse-of-discretion 
standard.36 
In Cooper, the Court upheld a mixed rationale of reprehensibility and 
deterrence for punitive damages.  The Court explained that juries acted 
irrationally because they were not bound by the optimal deterrence 
rationale.  Justice Stevens wrote for the Court: 
However attractive such an approach to punitive damages might be as 
an abstract policy matter, it is clear that juries do not normally engage 
in such a finely tuned exercise of deterrence calibration when awarding 
punitive damages.  After all, deterrence is not the only purpose served 
by punitive damages.  And there is no dispute that, in this case, 
deterrence was but one of four concerns the jury was instructed to 
consider when setting the amount of punitive damages.  Moreover, it is 
not at all obvious that even the deterrent function of punitive damages 
can be served only by economically optimal deterrence.  Citizens and 
legislators may rightly insist that they are willing to tolerate some loss 
in economic efficiency in order to deter what they consider morally 
offensive conduct, albeit cost-beneficial morally offensive conduct; 
efficiency is just one consideration among many.37 
                                                                                                                       
because it had thought it was not required to disclose the damage.  BMW pointed to states such as 
California that had statutes that said damage less than three percent of the value of the car, or $500, 
whichever was greater, need not be disclosed during the sale of a car.  Id. at 578.  The jury, in its 
finding of malice, likely was not persuaded that BMW acted in good faith.  The jury was not given 
the information about fines in California.  Even if given the information, the jury may have been 
persuaded that a $4000 loss in value of a $40,000 car would not have given BMW a safe harbor, 
even in California. 
 32. 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
 33. Id. at 429. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 443. 
 36. Id. at 431. 
 37. Id. at 438–39 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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Although Justice Stevens saw a need for flexibility in determining the 
underlying purpose of punitive damages, he went on to argue that juries 
are less able to apply this mix of rationales.  He concluded that juries 
were particularly inept at considering the third Gore factor, comparing 
fines in criminal cases with punitive damages.38 
Justice Stevens’s rationale is unclear and his conclusions may have 
no obvious explanation.39  It is unfair to say that juries cannot draw 
comparisons, if they are not given the necessary information.  In 
addition, one wonders why, if a jury can do complex calculations such as 
determining the present value of future loss of income and medical 
expenses, it should not be able to compare fines as one of the factors in 
awarding punitive damages.40  Jurors also decide whether to impose a 
death sentence in capital murder cases.  If juries are better than judges at 
this decision, it seems likely they are better at deciding punitive damages 
in a civil case when an institution harms others through intentional or 
reckless conduct. 
Not long after Cooper, the Supreme Court exercised its own de novo 
review of a punitive damage award.  In April 2003, the Court decided 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.41  In the 
underlying suit, the Campbells were sued in tort for injuries arising from 
an automobile accident.42  They were defended by their insurance 
company, State Farm.43  The Campbells’ insurance policy required State 
Farm to defend them and to act in good faith to resolve claims on their 
behalf.44  State Farm, however, refused to settle the claims for $50,000 
(the policy limit) and insisted on a trial.45  State Farm assured the 
Campbells that their liability would be limited to the policy limit.46  A 
Utah jury, however, awarded punitive damages in an amount more than 
three times the policy limit.47  After the verdict, State Farm refused to 
take an appeal and suggested that the Campbells sell their home.48 
                                                     
 38. Id. at 440. 
 39. See infra Part IV.D (arguing that juries should decide damages). 
 40. Paul J. Zwier, The Consequentialist/Nonconsequentialist Ethical Distinction: A Tool for the 
Formal Appraisal of Traditional Negligence and Economic Tort Analysis, 26 B.C. L. REV. 905, 941 
(1985). 
 41. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 42. Id. at 412–13. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 413–14. 
 45. Id. at 413. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. (awarding $185,849). 
 48. Id. 
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The Campbells sued State Farm for bad faith in refusing to accept 
the plaintiff’s settlement offer.49  State Farm initially defended, but 
before trial and after its underlying appeal was denied, it offered to pay 
the Campbells’ judgment.50  The Campbells sued nonetheless and at trial 
exposed the reason State Farm refused settlement in the underlying law 
suit—settlement would not have allowed State Farm to meet certain 
nationwide profitability goals.51  The Campbells proved that State Farm 
routinely denied justified claims to meet profitability targets.52 
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg explained that State Farm’s 
Performance Planning and Review (PP&R) scheme (1) “functioned . . . 
as an unlawful scheme to deny benefits owed consumers by paying out 
less than fair value in order to meet preset, arbitrary payout targets;” (2) 
“adversely affected Utah residents” when State Farm “falsif[ied] or 
with[eld] evidence in claim files;” (3) subjected claimants to unjustified 
attacks on their “character, reputation, and credibility,” which further 
prejudiced claimants against the jury if their cases went to trial; (4) 
exposed its claims agents to “intolerable and recurrent pressure to reduce 
payouts below fair value;” (5) instructed its agents to “pad files with self-
serving documents” and omit critical information; (6) destroyed 
documents in the Campbells’ file; and  (7) “deliberately crafted” its 
business plan to “prey on consumers who were unlikely to defend 
themselves”—the elderly, the poor, and other consumers who were 
infirm.53 
The jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory 
damages and $145 million in punitive damages.54  The trial court 
subsequently reduced the damages to $1 million and $25 million, 
respectively.55  When the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the jury verdict, 
State Farm appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.56 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded (Justices Scalia, Thomas, 
and Ginsburg dissented).57  The Court used the three Gore factors to 
justify its decision.  In applying the reprehensibility factor, the Court 
                                                     
 49. Id. at 414. 
 50. Id. at 413. 
 51. Id. at 414–15. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 431–35 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (noting 
that Mr. Campbell was himself infirm at the time of settlement, suffering from a recent stroke and 
Parkinson’s disease). 
 54. Id. at 415 (majority opinion). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 416. 
 57. Id. at 429–38. 
ZWIER FINAL.DOC 4/15/2006  10:33:48 AM 
2006] THE UTILITY OF A NONCONSEQUENTIALIST RATIONALE 411 
held that a state does not have a legitimate interest in imposing punitive 
damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside the 
state’s jurisdiction, unless those unlawful acts have a specific nexus to 
the defendant’s acts against the plaintiffs.58  This was significantly 
different from the holding in Gore, where the Court ruled that Alabama 
had no jurisdiction to punish for acts lawful in other jurisdictions when 
determining the degree of reprehensibility.59 
The Court found that State Farm’s denials of other claims outside 
Utah, pursuant to its PP&R policy, were dissimilar acts, independent 
from the acts giving rise to the claim, and, therefore, could not serve as 
the basis for punitive damages.60  The Court, instead, focused on the acts 
                                                     
 58. Id. at 421–22. 
 59. BMW of N. Am., Inc., v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572–73 (1996). 
 60. The Court took advantage of the ambiguity in the meanings of the words “act” and “intent.”  
The Court defined State Farm’s action and intent very narrowly.  In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg 
described the act quite differently than Justice Kennedy in the majority opinion.  Focusing on State 
Farm’s firm-wide PP&R program that was designed to use the claims-adjustment process as a profit 
center, Justice Ginsburg described State Farm’s act as a deliberate decision to put profit over the 
policy holders’ rights to fair treatment.  State Farm, 538 U.S. at 431–35 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
Meanwhile, Justice Kennedy described State Farm’s act more narrowly and as being unrelated to its 
bad faith regarding fire claims.  Id. at 424 (majority opinion).  These different ways of defining the 
offending act account for the different outcomes at the end. 
 Philosophers, for example, define “act” in a number of ways.  They can define an act 
empirically as “what someone does.”  This definition avoids the Cartesian duality between mind and 
body and considers an act only as behavior.  The reason for the popularity of behaviorism is that it 
avoids what “can’t be got at” or what goes on in the mind.  On the other hand, most of us agree that 
“twitches, blinks, coughs, and sneezes” are not acts.  Norman S. Care & Charles Landesman, 
Preface to READINGS IN THE THEORY OF ACTION, at xv (Norman S. Care & Charles Landesman eds., 
1968).  To get the label “act,” the act must include some analysis of the mental process behind the 
act, usually thought of as volition.  However, many acts are done under duress, which gives rise to a 
distinction between volitions and intentions.  Defining acts as behavior and intentions leads not only 
to the problem of never knowing what one truly intends but also to the problem of dual intent.  As a 
result, some describe acts, or explain them, by referring to the intentions, purposes, desires, and 
motives of agents. 
 Others argue that acts need to be evaluated in terms of ethics, or rules, that surround the 
agent’s actions.  John Rawls argues that for an act to be evaluated as right or wrong, it must be 
analyzed beyond its immediate consequences to determine whether there are any ethical, moral, or 
teleological bases for evaluating the action.  Id. at xxxi.  Rawls might say that ethics help determine 
whether an institution’s denial of a car-insurance claim is similar to the denial of a fire-insurance 
claim, assuming it was done simply to meet profit quotas set by the company. 
 The Supreme Court did not engage in this latter form of Rawlsian analysis. Moral damages are 
damages of the Rawlsian sort and correlate with an understanding of an act in the context of the rules 
that surround its doing.  Using a football analogy, dropping a pass in the end zone is either of no 
consequence or of ultimate consequence.  It depends if the pass is dropped in the last seconds of the 
fourth quarter when a score would have altered the outcome.  Similarly, denying a claim in an auto 
accident is dissimilar to denying a claim for fire damage, unless a company has rules against treating 
its insured in bad faith and if, in each instance, the claim is denied simply to meet profit quotas. 
 Punitive damages provide punishment in light of the nature of the conduct and in the nature of 
the rules the conduct violates.  That is why our system struggles to award punitive damages because 
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of the individual agent who (1) instructed the Campbells to reject the 
settlement, (2) counseled them not to get a separate attorney, (3) told 
them that State Farm would not appeal, and (4) informed them that they 
had no rights to redress against State Farm.61  The Court found the 
Campbells’ allegations against State Farm to be dissimilar to the claims 
of other policy holders under homeowner, fire, and other insurance, even 
though there was proof that other agents had engaged in similar devious 
behavior.62 
Justice Kennedy explained that retribution remains a major factor in 
awarding punitive damages.63  However, he stated that punitive damages 
should not exceed a single-digit multiple of the compensatory damages 
suffered by the plaintiffs.64  In combination with the limitation that state 
courts should only consider acts occurring in their respective states, the 
outside multiplier serves as a significant cap on jury verdicts.  It 
demonstrates that the Supreme Court follows an economic efficiency, or 
deterrence-based, rationale for punitive damages that assumes individual 
compensation as its prime reference point. 
As Professor Galligan argues, a deterrence-based rationale for 
punitive damages, especially one that has an augmented damages 
component, seems to be a critical rationale supporting punitive 
damages.65  Campbell severely cramps the ability of a court to provide 
 
                                                                                                                       
our market encourages rational conduct—conduct that would weigh injury to an individual against 
expected profits. 
 61. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 413–14. 
 62. Id. at 423.  Justice Stevens’s opinion may have been influenced by his attempt to be 
consistent with his earlier opinions involving jury discretion in capital punishment cases.  Similarly, 
Justices Scalia and Thomas may have been for fewer due process limitations in civil punitive 
damages cases because of the opinions they held in capital punishment cases involving limits on jury 
discretion. 
 63. Id. at 416. 
 64. Justice Kennedy stated, 
With regard to the second Gore guidepost, the Court has been reluctant to identify 
concrete constitutional limits on the ratio between harm, or potential harm, to the plaintiff 
and the punitive damages award; but, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit 
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages will satisfy due process. . . .  Single-
digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the 
State’s goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards . . . with 145-to-1 [ratios]. . . .  
[B]ecause there are no rigid benchmarks, . . . ratios greater than those we have previously 
upheld may comport with due process where a particularly egregious act has resulted in 
only a small amount of economic damages. . . .  [But when] compensatory damages are 
substantial, then a lesser ratio . . . can reach the outermost limit of the due process 
guarantee. 
Id. at 424–25 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 65. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive Damages, 
51 LA. L. REV. 3, 7–14 (1990). 
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augmented damages.  In addition, it eviscerates the ability of the jury to 
exact retribution.66 
One might argue that the holdings of Gore, Cooper, and Campbell 
are inapposite to the retribution rationale described above.  After all, 
Gore and Campbell continue to give lip service to the role of retribution 
in determining punitive damages.  Cooper holds that the judge and 
appellate court should become involved but only after the jury has had its 
say.  Still, Gore, Cooper, and Campbell point the reviewing court in a 
new direction requiring de novo review, a specific nexus between the 
plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s acts in the respective state, and the 
application of a single-digit multiplier cap.  Recent decisions by state 
courts show the power of Justice Stevens’s statement in Campbell 
creating a cap (or a de facto safe harbor for those who want to calculate 
the extent of their exposure) for jury-awarded punitive damages.67 
Ultimately, the Court sends a message to state courts when it is 
cautious regarding jurisdiction and when it encourages ratios that 
severely restrict a jury’s power to award punitive damages. 68  The Court 
                                                     
 66. Justice Kennedy’s analysis ignores the intentional tort roots of punitive damages.  Dean 
Galligan suggests that tort law is concerned about deterrence, while intentional torts remind us that 
retribution can be used to protect against violence.  Galligan, supra note 65, at 9 n.7. 
 67. See Henley v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 73 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that 
“[i]n light of Campbell, we do not believe the 17-to-1 ratio reflected in the present judgment can 
withstand scrutiny”); Benham v. Wallingford Auto Park, Inc., No. CV0204594185, 2003 WL 
22905163, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 26, 2003) (stating that “[a]lthough the conduct of the 
defendant in this case was egregious, the court is not of the opinion that it requires ten times the 
compensatory damage” and reducing the award to “a 7:1 ratio”); Daka, Inc. v. McCrae, 839 A.2d 
682, 697 (D.C. 2003) (noting that “[a]lthough the facts established by the jury’s verdict justified a 
significant award of punitive damages, the sum awarded—reflecting a ratio of 26:1 to the 
compensatory damages award—lacked the reasonableness and proportionality required of a punitive 
damages award”); Bocci v. Key Pharm., Inc., 79 P.3d 908, 910 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (reducing 
punitive damages to a seven-to-one ratio); Waddil v. Anchor Hocking, Inc., 78 P.3d 570, 576 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2003) (reducing damages to a four-to-one ratio); Viener v. Jacobs, 834 A.2d 546, 562 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2003) (acknowledging that, on remand, the court should consider Campbell’s ratio rule 
and stating that “the trial court may recalculate the amount of the punitive damage award, if 
necessary, to comport with Mr. Justice Kennedy’s admonition”). 
 68. For example, the Gore Court stated as follows: 
Of course, we have consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked 
by a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and potential damages 
to the punitive award.  Indeed, low awards of compensatory damages may properly 
support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly 
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.  A higher ratio 
may also be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value 
of the noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine.  It is appropriate, 
therefore, to reiterate our rejection of a categorical approach.  Once again, we return to 
what we said in . . . Haslip: We need not and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical 
bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and constitutionally unacceptable that 
would fit every case. 
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582–83 (1996) (internal citations and quotations 
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seems to espouse a consequentialist justification of punitive damages that 
unduly restricts and hinders their maximum moral effect.69  In addition, 
because punitive damages have large value and policy implications and 
constitutional analysis is required, the question is who should determine 
punitive damages—judge, jury, or formula?  In deciding that an appellate 
court should make the decision de novo and that it should do so with a 
particular ratio in mind, Justice Stevens seems to follow the Polinsky and 
Shavell schools of thought—optimal deterrence is too sophisticated for 
jurors.70 
Are appellate judges truly better or more expert at awarding punitive 
damages?  Of course the answer to this question hinges on the purpose of 
punitive damages.  Certainly, a judge is more, or at least as, adept at 
keeping awards within “rational” limits, as those limits are defined by the 
Court.  But what about expressing moral outrage or protecting the 
integrity of the market?  If these are valid uses of punitive damage 
awards, then we must determine whether a judge is really better than a 
jury in these arenas.  Are not judges more political and, therefore, more 
susceptible to the influence of corporate America?  Is one individual 
truly more equipped to determine the beliefs of society concerning the 
morality of a given action than twelve individuals working collectively?  
Is a well-educated lawyer, hardened by years on the bench, more in touch 
with what is considered a fair punishment for a corporation’s willful 
disregard of consumer safety? 
III. METAETHICS AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
A. Defining Consequentialism and Nonconsequentialism 
A metaethical understanding of the punitive damages debate 
illustrates why it is necessary for the Court to continue to allow for a 
moral or nonconsequentialist rationale for punitive damages.  Metaethics 
also provides the impetus for uncovering and articulating the underlying 
norms that support a broad, pluralist retribution analysis.  Furthermore, 
metaethics shows the harm in assigning the responsibilities of the jury to 
                                                                                                                       
omitted).  The Supreme Court has sent two conflicting messages and the lower courts seem to have 
picked up the last one. 
 69. This same question has been asked concerning the underlying rationale of criminal 
punishment.  See Robinson & Darley, supra note 4, at 478 (arguing a utilitarian reason to continue to 
focus on moral blameworthiness in criminal punishment). 
 70. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 6, at 891 (stating “judges and juries often will be able to 
apply the formula without difficulty because the formula transparently (if trivially) implies that no 
punitive damages are needed”). 
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an appellate judge.  To focus and simplify the comparison of an 
economic-efficiency-based deterrence model and traditional punitive 
damages on formal grounds, this Article uses ethical categorization as a 
starting point. 
Historically, philosophers have categorized ethical systems 
according to their consequentialist and nonconsequentialist 
characteristics.71  In short, nonconsequentialists are unconcerned with the 
outcomes of their decisions and appeal to morality, God’s law, or to 
virtues that are “ends in themselves.”72  Consequentialists, on the other 
hand, are concerned with the ultimate result of their decisions.73  
Consequentialists are ultimately utilitarians who base their faith in what 
will produce optimal efficiency.74 
The categorization process examines an ethical system’s 
justification.  A system is consequentialist if it appeals to the effects on 
society when measured against some standard or principle.75  It is 
nonconsequentialist when the justifications are found in rules or 
absolutes that the system provides.76  Consequentialism involves 
predicting consequences.77  Nonconsequentialism involves weighing and 
ranking competing values or virtues.78  Philosophers have found this 
 
                                                     
 71. JACQUES P. THIROUX, ETHICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 21 (1977).  While philosophers have 
long recognized two schools of thought in ethics, Thiroux is the first to call them consequentialist 
and nonconsequentialist.  Traditionally, ethical theories have been divided by the labels teleological 
and deontological.  See WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHICS 13–20 (1963) (explaining the views of 
teleological and deontological theorists). 
 72. THIROUX, supra note 71, at 40. 
 73. Id. at 21. 
 74. Professor MacCormick, who studies these categories, defines this division of decision-
making ethics as follows: 
One can conceive of two extreme positions.  On the one extreme, the only justification of 
a decision would be in terms of all its consequences, however remote—in terms, that is, 
of its productivity of the greatest net benefit, taking together all consequences and 
judging them by some suitable criterion of benefit and detriment.  On the other extreme, 
the nature and quality of the decision, regardless of any of its consequences however 
proximate, would alone be allowed as relevant to its justification or its rightness. 
Neil MacCormick, On Legal Decisions and Their Consequences: From Dewey to Dworkin, 58 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 239, 239 (1983). 
 75. See THIROUX, supra note 71, at 21 (describing the decision-making process from a 
consequentialist’s point of view).  The various schools of egoism (universal, individual, and 
personal) as well as act and rule utilitarianism are categorized as consequentialist systems.  Id. at 21–
33. 
 76. Id. at 40.  Thiroux categorizes divine command theories and Kant’s categorical imperative 
as nonconsequentialist ethics.  Id. at 40, 44. 
 77. Id. at 21. 
 78. See id. at 48–49 (discussing the resolution of conflicting moral rules). 
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simple categorization helpful to the analysis and comparison of various 
philosophical ethical systems.79 
There inevitably will be deficiencies and inconsistencies in ethical 
systems where the systems are overly consequentialist or 
nonconsequentialist.80  The extreme consequentialist excludes any 
possibility of rationally justifying a decision because the ramifications of 
any ethical decision are infinite.81  If actors had to “know” all the 
consequences of a given act before acting, they would be paralyzed.  
They might favor no action, but inaction has consequences as well.  
Extreme consequentialism, therefore, necessarily accepts the proposition 
that all acts are irrational.  The moderate consequentialist compensates 
for this problem by trusting some unstated set of values such as the 
theory that the unregulated market will sort out normative behaviors or 
that a policy of inaction over action will maintain the status quo. 
On the other hand, the extreme nonconsequentialist ignores that the 
“nature and quality of decisions and acts are . . . [themselves] constituted 
by the consequences the decider intends, foresees, or hopes to bring 
about.”82  In addition, the extreme nonconsequentialist ignores the extent 
to which “care for one’s neighbor” requires that one seriously consider 
the “foreseeable outcomes of one’s acts and decisions before finally 
acting or deciding.”83  Obviously, the more momentous the act or 
decision under consideration, the more important this consideration 
becomes.84 
These metaethical models provide a key to the comparison of a 
punitive damages model defined by deterrence in relationship to 
compensation with traditional retribution-based punishment.  A system 
that strictly follows consequentialism falls prey to the indefiniteness of 
the ultimate standard that results from the uncertainty of future 
consequences.85  A purely nonconsequentialist system, which relies on 
rules and absolutes, is vulnerable to criticism because it lacks a rational 
                                                     
 79. See id. at 21–50 (defining and comparing the categorical theories of morality); see also 
Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 5, at 104 n.9 (equating utilitarianism to consequentialism); see 
generally DONALD REGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND CO-OPERATION (1980) (creating a theory of co-
operative utilitarianism to help resolve the conflict between the two major camps of utilitarianism). 
 80. THIROUX, supra note 71, at 49–50. 
 81. MacCormick, supra note 74, at 239. 
 82. Id. at 240. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See THIROUX, supra note 71, at 49–50 (discussing the pitfalls of ultimate rules and 
absolutes). 
ZWIER FINAL.DOC 4/15/2006  10:33:48 AM 
2006] THE UTILITY OF A NONCONSEQUENTIALIST RATIONALE 417 
justification and results in incompleteness.86  In response to these 
criticisms, nonconsequentialists inevitably smuggle consequentialist 
arguments into their system.87  This subjects the nonconsequentialist 
system to attacks not only for incompleteness but also for 
inconsistency.88  Yet some degree of logical inconsistency is necessary to 
any ethical system that tries to deal fairly with disputes and also produce 
rules governing behavior.89 
B. Applying Ethical Categories to the Deterrence-Versus-Punishment 
Debate 
In judging and comparing rationales for punitive damage awards, 
this comparison between consequentialism and nonconsequentialism is 
                                                     
 86. See id. at 46 (giving examples of the negative impact certain absolute rules would have).  
Posner is a prime proponent of consequentialism in negligence law.  He writes, 
  Perhaps, then, the dominant function of the fault system is to generate rules of liability 
that if followed will bring about, at least approximately, the efficient—cost-justified—
level of accidents and safety.  Under this view, damages are assessed against the 
defendant as a way of measuring the costs of accidents, and the damages so assessed are 
paid over to the plaintiff (to be divided with his lawyer) as the price of enlisting their 
participation in the operation of the system.  Because we do not like to see resources 
squandered, a judgment of negligence has inescapable overtones of moral disapproval, 
for it implies that there was a cheaper alternative to the accident.  Conversely, there is no 
moral indignation in the case in which the cost of prevention would have exceeded the 
cost of the accident.  Where the measures necessary to avert the accident would have 
consumed excessive resources, there is no occasion to condemn the defendant for not 
having taken them. 
  If indignation has its roots in inefficiency, we do not have to decide whether 
regulation, or compensation, or retribution, or some mixture of these best describes the 
dominant purpose of negligence law.  In any case, the judgment of liability depends 
ultimately on a weighing of costs and benefits. 
Posner, Theory, supra note 5, at 33–34.  Even Posner notes that when the actor acts with choice or 
intent moral retribution may trump a cost-benefit analysis directed at deterrence. 
 John Witte sees, in the Reformation, an understanding of various uses of the law different 
from simple deterrence and efficiency.  WITTE, supra note 3, at 170–71. 
 Consequentialists ignore other important uses in the law, including society’s expression 
through the jury of moral outrage and its expressive or educative function concerning what is and is 
not fair market behavior. 
 87. See Posner, Theory, supra note 5, at 47 (stating that some would think it unfair for a man to 
be found negligent for an act resulting in unforeseen consequences).  Thiroux poses the following 
question: “Even without this doctrine, when you push any ethical system back far enough, asking 
why one should do these things, won’t your answers have to bring in consequences for yourself, 
others, or all concerned?”  THIROUX, supra note 71, at 47. 
 88. See THIROUX, supra note 71, at 49 (discussing the inapplicability of justification to absolve 
moral rules). 
 89. Posner argues that proponents of other ethical systems are generally incapable of deriving 
specific policies or guidelines for human behavior.  Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 5, at 114.  He 
recognizes the inherent inconsistencies in Rawls’s work, in the Kantian theorists, in Epstein, and in 
Dworkin’s theories.  Id. at 114–15. 
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extremely helpful.  It exposes the weaknesses in a system based solely on 
deterrence.  It should prompt nonconsequentialists to reexamine their 
underlying beliefs and consequentialists to look beyond economic 
effects.  To answer the growing consequentialist school, the 
nonconsequentialist must uncover the “natural laws” in the fabric of a 
free democracy that lead to the development of punitive damages 
allowing for retribution.90 
1. Optimal Deterrence and Consequentialism 
Optimal deterrence focuses on just the right amount of deterrence to 
efficiently prevent certain harmful behavior.  It does not seek to over 
deter because its proponents believe that action and risk-taking need to 
be encouraged for the overall improvement of society.  Optimal 
deterrence is consequentialist because it is concerned with establishing 
rules that best balance the consequences of punishment against the utility 
of a market place of vigorous and creative risk-taking.91 
In Cooper, Justice Stevens stated that the most rational way to 
decide punitive damages was with reference to optimal deterrence.92  The 
Court cited93 professors Polinsky and Shavell and their leading article, 
Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, where they describe the 
delicate balancing act involved in determining optimal deterrence: 
to achieve appropriate deterrence, injurers should be made to pay for 
the harm their conduct generates, not less, not more.  If injurers pay 
less than for the harm they cause, under deterrence may result—that is, 
precautions may be inadequate, product prices may be too low, and 
risk-producing activities may be excessive.  Conversely, if injurers are 
made to pay more than for the harm they cause, wasteful precautions 
may be taken, product prices may be inappropriately high, and risky but 
socially beneficial activities may be undesirably curtailed. 
 It follows from these observations that a crucial question for 
consideration is whether injurers sometimes escape liability for harms 
for which they are responsible.  If they do, the level of liability imposed 
on them when they are found liable needs to exceed compensatory 
damages so that, on average, they will pay for the harm that they cause. 
 
                                                     
 90. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 4, at 478 (urging courts to “adopt rules that distribute 
liability and punishment according to desert, even if a nondesert distribution appears in the short-run 
to alter the possibility of reducing crime”). 
 91. Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law 
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 505–06 (1980). 
 92. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 438–39 (2001). 
 93. Id. 
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This excess liability can be labeled “punitive damages,” and failure to 
impose it would result in inadequate deterrence.94 
Polinsky and Shavell also state, in reference to deterrence, that 
“[w]hen an injurer has a chance of escaping liability, the proper level of 
total damage to impose on him, if he is found liable, is the harm caused 
multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability of being found liable.”95  
By way of example, if A tortiously injures four people, but the odds of 
A’s being held liable are one in ten, and one of the four, B (but no 
others), files suit and establishes damages of $100,000, then the proper 
total recovery for B is the harm caused multiplied by the reciprocal of the 
probability of A being found liable.  Here, the harm caused is $100,000 
and the probability of liability was 1/10, the reciprocal of which is ten.  
Consequently, according to Polinsky and Shavell, the proper award for B 
is $100,000 x 10, or $1,000,000. 
The apparent appeal of the Polinsky and Shavell rule is that it is 
mathematical and certain.  In addition, it seems to depend on probability 
theory, which suggests rationality.  In this way, it has the same 
attractiveness as does the Hand formula in tort law.96  Yet, as we will see, 
it is subject to the same criticisms of any formulaic attempt at balancing 
utilities. 
2. The Problems with Optimal Deterrence 
Consequentialists want juries to apply mathematical calculations 
based on assumptions about the components of market efficiency and 
optimal deterrence.  They argue that it is more rational, more predictable, 
and, therefore, more fair to use a mathematical formula.  Evidence for 
the assertion that ethical systems inevitably rest on beliefs and intuitions 
about the future can be found in the specific workings of the elements of 
this deterrence-based punitive damages system.  Such evidence further 
supports the observation that an unbalanced, overly nonconsequentialist 
system invariably will include many consequentialist features. 
                                                     
 94. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 6, at 873–74. 
 95. Id. at 891. 
 96. The Hand formula is a widely cited method for determining duty in negligence actions.  It 
was described by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 
1947).  Judge Hand argued that duty is defined by considering the probability of some harm, 
multiplied by the gravity of any injury, weighed against the cost of adequate precautions.  Id. at 173. 
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a. Uncertainty and Incompleteness 
Law and economics theory has long argued that the common law 
should be judged according to its certainty and completeness.97  The 
problem is that no human decision-making system is ever certain or 
complete.  Professors Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkode discuss the 
uncertainties inherent in jury punitive damage awards concerning pain 
and suffering, wrongful death, and a myriad of other calculations.98  
These uncertainties are applicable to any legal or factual determination, 
whether made by a judge or a jury.  Uncertainty is no reason to take 
punitive damage awards out of the hands of the jury. 
In addition, where the economist is overly consequentialist in his 
directives concerning the ability of the market to project future values, 
one must question the likelihood of ever having adequate information 
about the consequences of certain decisions or the future values of 
certain commodities.99  Without such information, predicting 
consequences or values is an uncertain process.  The economist can 
guarantee no more certainty about the consequences he projects than can 
the jury, a mathematician, or anyone else.100 
Moreover, as previously discussed, a crucial component of the 
deterrence-based model (the Polinsky and Shavell formula) is the 
assignment of a probability.  Assigning probabilities also has both 
consequentialist and nonconsequentialist features.  Though assigning 
probabilities seems only to involve a determination of the likelihood of 
some future event from evidence of past events,101 whether this process 
can ever actually be done, without skewing the probabilities in favor of a 
preferred outcome, is highly questionable.102  In fact, some argue that 
                                                     
 97. See generally Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 5. 
 98. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and 
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2074 (1998). 
 99. WESLEY C. SALMON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE 76 (1967); THIROUX, 
supra note 71, at 34–38. 
 100. SALMON, supra note 99, at 76. 
 101. Id. at 68.  Salmon refers to this description of probability as the logical interpretation of 
probability.  Id.  He writes that such a description involves inductive reasoning.  Id. at 68–69. 
 102. Salmon calls this description of probability the “subjective interpretation.”  Id. at 68.  
Salmon writes about Rudolf Carnap’s theory of inductive logic, which relates to Posner’s attempts at 
defining an economic ethic: 
  Carnap’s earlier systems of inductive logic have been criticized—especially by those 
who are more interested in questions of practical statistical inference than in foundational 
questions—on the ground that [Carnap’s] confirmation functions were defined only for 
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decision makers inevitably will assign the probability with reference to 
their own beliefs about the best outcomes for the analysis.103  Thus, the 
process of assigning probabilities is much like argument by analogy, 
anecdote, or from individual experience: the assigning of a probability 
has both consequentualist and nonconsequentialist overtones.  It arguably 
is tied to past events but also requires the decision maker to predict the 
future in light of new, changing circumstances. 
Even if the psychology of the process would allow for the 
assignment of an objective probability figure, such a process is uncertain 
where there is little or no experience with, or empirical data to support, 
assigning the probability.104  As such, it is primarily a consequentialist 
process.  Where society changes so rapidly that the decision maker can 
trust only his intuition, he will most likely assign a high probability if his 
intuition tells him that the conduct in question is likely to affect society 
badly.  In contrast, he will probably assign a low probability if his 
intuition tells him that the conduct in question will not.  Thus, when the 
decision maker has no experience, the assignment of probabilities is very 
consequentialist and becomes more nonconsequentialist only where the 
decision maker or society has had experience with the accident.105  
Therefore, the process of assigning probabilities is not necessarily a 
nonconsequentialist process, and it does not provide the same degree of 
ethical certainty in all situations.106 
Assuming that an economist can overcome these problems, he has 
one remaining obstacle: an ethical processing problem.  As to who is to 
make the decision about wealth maximization, the economist can 
disclose little, only asserting that this valuation process and application 
of the Hand formula (or the Polinsky and Shavell formula) will be, and 
can be, done by a court.  For example, Judge Richard Posner, a major 
proponent of law and economics, states simply that “a court can make a 
                                                                                                                       
that are patently inadequate as languages for science.  In his more recent work, Carnap 
has been developing systems that are able to treat physical magnitudes quantitatively. 
Id. at 74–75. 
 103. Id. at 79.  Salmon calls this view the “personalistic” view.  Id.  See Daniel Kahneman & 
Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, SCI. AM., Jan. 1982, at 160 (describing how 
mathematical patterns can describe how people regularly depart from objective reasoning when 
faced with risky choices). 
 104. This is the most likely explanation for the variability of dollar figures assigned by juries. 
 105. See SALMON, supra note 99, at 76 (discussing the addressing of “unobserved matters of fact 
on the basis of evidence concerning observed matters of fact”). 
 106. Salmon notes that determining the probabilities with any certainty depends on the 
requirement of “total evidence.”  Id.  In this way, economic analysis parallels negligence analysis.  
Where society has had wide experience with a certain type of accident, the rules are more easily and 
consistently applied. 
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reasonably accurate guess as to the allocation of resources that would 
maximize wealth.”107  Yet it is obvious that if assigning a probability is 
based on the decision maker’s knowledge—in particular, his knowledge 
of both the harm that intentional behavior causes society and the chances 
that someone will discover the wrongdoing—then the experience of 
more members of society ought to balance out the bias that any one 
decision maker might have. 
b. Deterrence Calculated on Compensation or Related to Profit 
Motive? 
As every first-year torts teacher knows, the Pinto example raises 
from students strong reactions to the immorality of Ford’s decision to 
forgo the installation of rubber sleeves around the car’s gas tank.108  Even 
if we could determine how much is needed to deter certain conduct, 
some students feel that human life is priceless and that violators should 
have to pay more than this fixed amount.  The students’ intuitions are 
backed by moral philosophy. There is considerable debate as to why 
anyone would assume that a system based on optimal, efficient 
deterrence will produce “good.”109  If wealth maximization means 
nothing more than a process by which good is maximized, then the 
formula of optimal deterrence is no improvement over the existing 
utilitarian formulation.110  This is similar to the kind of reasoning 
attempted by Posner when he defines wealth as the value in dollars, or 
dollar equivalents, of everything in society.111  Some values should not 
be converted to dollars because such a decision-making process 
encourages the treatment of individuals as though they are money.112 
                                                     
 107. Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 5, at 120.  It is interesting to speculate as to whom 
Posner refers when he says that the decision will be made by the court.  Because he does not specify 
whether judge, jury, a combination of judge and jury, or an economic expert under cover of the 
court, will make the decision, it is unclear whether the decision will be made by a fact-finding or by 
a law-making person.  Because we are not told the nature of the decision maker, the usual ethical 
indications given by this information are lacking. 
 108. See generally George Priest, Economics of Civil Justice Reform Proposals, 9 KAN. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 401, 402–05 (2000) (discussing the Pinto disaster). 
 109. See THIROUX, supra note 71, at 20–38 (discussing consequentialist (teleological) theories of 
morality). 
 110. See id. at 28–34 (discussing the basic tenets of utilitarian moral philosophy). 
 111. Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 5, at 119. 
 112. See Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 2 TORT L. REV. 99, 104 (1994) (discussing 
problems raised by monetary compensation for tort victims).  Consider the classic Ford Pinto 
example.  If Ford could save eleven dollars per car by not installing a gas tank sleeve and it expected 
to sell eleven million cars, then its expected profit by not installing the sleeve would be $121 
million.  Factoring in the resulting 200 deaths and injuries at roughly $200,000 in damages per case 
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Focusing solely on deterrence is also undesirable because it does 
nothing to take away the market actor’s profit motive.  The 
consequentialist should ask how the Polinsky and Shavell formula—
which does not cap damages but still provides for a calculation based on 
compensation to the plaintiff multiplied by the reciprocal of the actor’s 
chance of getting caught—really serves society by producing wealth 
maximization.  Why, for instance, are the plaintiff’s damages used rather 
than an estimation of the defendant’s expected total profit or the average 
harm to each person likely to be harmed?113  Benthamite beliefs in 
limited government interference are imbedded in narrow definitions of 
“act,” (which exclude the extended consequences of the act) and the 
Benthamite market sense of justice is unstated support for optimal 
deterrence.  As such, economics is ultimately supported by a part of the 
same utilitarian belief system that supports all of torts, especially 
negligence.  Similarly, it also fails where its cost-benefit-analysis support 
does not improve upon predictability or certainty. 
The deterrence model assumes that market actors will act rationally.  
This is a leap of faith akin to the leap of faith any deontological system 
makes.  Accepting the nonconsequentialist aspects of market theory 
depends upon one’s acceptance of the assumptions that the economist 
makes.  These assumptions are the economist’s articles of faith.  
Moreover, these assumptions are certainly not without criticism.114  For 
instance, one may question why it is that a hypothetical market is useful, 
reliable, or even useable.115  Use of hypothetical markets has proved, in 
certain cases, to be a subjective and arbitrary system of decision 
making.116  Additionally, one might criticize the lack of empirical 
                                                                                                                       
($40 million total), Ford would still gain more than $100 million by not installing the sleeve.  
Although immoral, Ford’s decision not to install the sleeve was indeed rational.  The purpose of 
punitive damages is to cause morality and rationality to align.  If protecting consumers is moral (and 
we all know it is), then punitive damages (from a purely deterrent rationale) should be high enough 
to make protecting consumers the economically efficient decision.  The amount of actual damage 
suffered by each individual killed or injured is irrelevant in this respect, as is the ratio of punitive 
damages to actual damages.  Punitive damage caps and ratios do not further the deterrent goal, let 
alone the purpose of retribution.  See generally David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive 
Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1982). 
 113. See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 
YALE L.J. 1055, 1058–59 (1972) (discussing allocation of accident-avoidance costs). 
 114. See, e.g., Izhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American 
Tort Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 51–56 (1980) (criticizing Posner’s theory of negligence). 
 115. See id. at 39 (considering the hypothetical and actual role of market deterrence). 
 116. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 279 (1990).  Klein and Coffee write, “valuation by reference to 
the market prices of comparable assets involves an obvious problem of circularity; it is a method that 
tells us that similar assets have similar values without telling us anything about how that value is 
determined.”  Id. 
ZWIER FINAL.DOC 4/15/2006  10:33:48 AM 
424 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
evidence validating the decisions produced by hypothetical markets.117  
This subjectivity, at such a crucial level, produces many of the 
inconsistencies from which Posner claims his system is free.118  In this 
way, Posner’s system is subject to the same leap-of-faith, subjectivity, 
and lack-of-empirical-verification criticisms to which all 
nonconsequentialist systems are subject.119 
It is important to consider the various alternatives available to either 
model and to any deterrence-based economic analysis under existing 
judicial constraints.  Each alternative affects not only the ethics used but 
also the decision maker’s power.  Does the economist mean for the 
decision maker to be a witness who is an expert economist; a judge; a 
particular type of judge, such as one versed in law and economics; or the 
jury?  Whether the decision maker is determining negligence or assessing 
the appropriateness of deterrence-based punitive damages, the decision 
takes the appearance of a mathematic formula.  Each formula appears to 
have an answer that is proved or found by the decision maker himself. 
With respect to either decision, the process can be controlled by 
economic experts giving opinions as to the value of certain activities and 
the probabilities associated with their occurrence, with reference only to 
the hypothetical market.  These opinions can be given and justified by 
reference to what experts usually rely on in giving similar opinions.120  
The fact-finding process can be under cover if the courts use this 
approach.  If the court uses the Polinsky and Shavell model, the 
economic expert can provide his opinion as to the value of harm done to 
the injured parties and the chance of the defendant getting caught.  Next, 
the expert will use the reciprocal of the probability of the defendant’s 
getting caught to determine the proper figure for optimal deterrence.  Or, 
if the court uses the Supreme Court’s formula, the expert will try to place 
a value on the harm done to the plaintiffs within its jurisdiction, 
determine what other acts done to potential plaintiffs in the jurisdiction 
are similar enough to count in the harm calculation, and then give the 
jury an outside cap for determining retribution at ten times the amount of 
the harm.  The jury will end up deciding little more than the economic 
expert’s credibility, or, if there is more than one expert, which one offers 
the most credible figure within the cap. 
                                                     
 117. See SALMON, supra note 99, at 75 (considering the problems inherent in hypothetical 
reasoning). 
 118. See Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 5, at 111 (arguing that the “economic approach, is 
less ‘rejectable’ than Utilitarinism or Kantianism”). 
 119. See THIROUX, supra note 71, at 50 (discussing criticisms general to nonconsequentialist 
systems). 
 120. See FED. R. EVID. 703 (addressing the use of expert witnesses). 
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Under the Polinsky and Shavell formula, the jury will only plug the 
expert value of the harm into the equation and multiply it by the 
probability, given by the expert, of the defendant’s getting caught.  But is 
the economic expert any better than a jury at judging the value of the 
harm done, the relevance of other harmful actions in the jurisdiction, or 
the probability of the defendant getting caught?  Perhaps the jury can be 
given the task of assigning these values and probabilities.  It is easy to 
see, however, that even with the jury included, where the appellate court 
has the power of de novo review, such a decision-making process 
supplants the decision of the jury with that of the judge.  Hence, the 
overall process appears to be nonconsequentialist because the jurors’ 
roles in making findings is more openly consequentialist and less 
defensible.  Its uncertainty and nonrationality is exposed in the opinion 
of the appellate court when the court shows why wealth maximization 
demands lowering the award.  Under this alternative, the process is rule 
oriented, absolutist, and, therefore, nonconsequentialist in appearance.  
The consequentialist nature of the process is carried out by the cap and 
by the appellate court on review. 
This ethical analysis helps us to better understand how 
deontological/moral reasoning leads to an examination of fundamental 
beliefs about human nature and the underlying assumptions that guide 
common law rules.  In other words, consequentialism and 
nonconsequentialism meet when the future is unknowable and the 
consequences cannot be determined.  At this point, different belief 
systems supporting deterrence-based analysis and augmented awards are 
revealed.  In the context of punitive damages, this place of meeting is in 
determining whether market efficiency ought to govern decisions or 
whether economic pluralism ought to play as important a role in areas of 
quasi-criminal behavior. 
Others note that there is a certain frustration that arises when a 
decision-making criterion is defended on the basis of beliefs as being 
more moral or ethical than another.  This frustration arises in any 
struggle between rationales or justifications based on different ethical 
theories.  Paul Robinson and John Darley make the point that retribution 
needs to be defended as producing good consequences.121  They argue 
                                                     
 121. Robinson & Darley, supra note 4, at 457.  What the authors say about criminal law applies 
directly to punitive damages: 
  The law is not irrelevant to these social and personal forces.  Criminal law, in 
particular, plays a central role in creating and maintaining the social consensus necessary 
for sustaining moral norms.  In fact, in a society as diverse as ours, the criminal law may 
be the only society-wide mechanism that transcends cultural and ethnic differences.  
Thus, the criminal law’s most important real-world effect may be its ability to assist in 
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that punishment based on moral outrage, corrective justice, and 
retribution serves a useful purpose in criminal law.122  They conclude that 
retribution based on morality is useful.123  The frustration comes when 
Robinson and Darley try to describe exactly why this is the case.  It is 
simply hard to prove.  They are betting, like the utilitarians, on their 
beliefs about human nature and the future effects of certain legal 
processes.124  Yet, the ability to articulate those social values and beliefs 
is essential.  If, by unpacking and describing those beliefs, Robinson and 
Darley help us see and reaffirm our connected values, then this process 
serves a vital purpose.  Yet, permanently disaggregating those social 
values and beliefs and removing them by restricting the jury to a value-
laden deterrence model threatens other important values imbedded in the 
jury system and risks undermining the authority of the common law. 
Prominent torts scholar and judge Guido Calabresi missed this point 
in a recent opinion on punitive damages.125  He acknowledged that a 
                                                                                                                       
the building, shaping, and maintaining of these norms and moral principles.  It can 
contribute to and harness the compliance-producing power of interpersonal relationships 
and personal morality. 
  The criminal law can have a second effect in gaining compliance with its commands.  
If it earns a reputation as a reliable statement of what the community, given sufficient 
information and time to reflect, would perceive as condemnable, people are more likely 
to defer to its commands as morally authoritative and as appropriate to follow in those 
borderline cases in which the propriety of certain conduct is unsettled or ambiguous in 
the mind of the actor.  The importance of this role should not be underestimated; in a 
society with the complex interdependencies characteristic of ours, an apparently harmless 
action can have destructive consequences.  When the action is criminalized by the legal 
system, one would want the citizen to “respect the law” in such an instance even though 
he or she does not immediately intuit why that action is banned.  Such deference will be 
facilitated if citizens are disposed to believe that the law is an accurate guide to 
appropriate prudential and moral behavior. 
  The extent of the criminal law’s effectiveness in both these respects—in facilitating 
and communicating societal consensus on what is and is not condemnable, and in gaining 
compliance in borderline cases through deference to its moral authority—we argue is to a 
great extent dependent on the degree of moral credibility that the criminal law has 
achieved in the minds of the citizens governed by it.  Thus, we assert, the criminal law’s 
moral credibility is essential to effective crime control, and is enhanced if the distribution 
of criminal liability is perceived as “doing justice,” that is, if it assigns liability and 
punishment in ways that the community perceives as consistent with the community’s 
principles of appropriate liability and punishment.  Conversely, the system’s moral 
credibility, and therefore its crime control effectiveness, is undermined by a distribution 
of liability that deviates from community perceptions of just desert. 
Id. at 456–57. 
 122. Id. at 497–98. 
 123. See id. at 498 (“[U]tility theorists ought to support liabilities assigned according to such a 
desert-based system.”). 
 124. See id. (“[W]e do not know with any certainty the degree of importance of the criminal 
law’s moral credibility.”). 
 125. See generally Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 250 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., 
concurring). 
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punitive damage award may serve general and specific deterrence 
functions.126  In addition, he argued that the current analysis of punitive 
damages was clouded by the merging of these functions.127  Moreover, 
he wrote that disaggregation of the general deterrence function from 
other truly punitive functions would have a clarifying effect and make 
appellate review simpler, clearer, and more focused.128 
The contrary is true.  What I have attempted to show is that limiting 
lower courts and juries to a certain kind of harm done, to a narrower 
class of plaintiffs, and to a cap on the amount of punitive damages has a 
two-fold effect.  The first effect is that the law of punitive damages, 
while giving more predictability within the cap, is at least as uncertain 
and subjective as the previous system.  Second, and more importantly, 
the next part of this Article demonstrates that this shift in the decision-
making ethic undercuts two of the common law’s principal uses: 
protecting the inestimable worth of the individual and expressing moral 
outrage against the outrageous acts of outliers.  I argue that appellate 
courts, as ultimate decision makers, are forced to accept a decision-
making ethic that is monolithic in its values, “commoditizes” human 
suffering, and limits the ability of society to sufficiently deter intentional 
wrongdoing and to express moral outrage against vicious acts. 
                                                     
 126. Id. at 245. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Judge Calabresi noted, 
  Although widely accepted by economists and acknowledged by some courts, the 
multiplier function of punitive damages has nonetheless been applied haphazardly at best.  
One reason this is so is that the twin goals of deterrence and retribution are often 
conflated, rather than recognized as analytically distinct objectives.  The term “punitive 
damages” itself contributes greatly to the confusion.  For punitive damages, the term 
traditionally used for damages beyond what is needed to compensate the individual 
plaintiff, improperly emphasizes the retributive function of such compensatory damages 
at the expense of their multiplier-deterrent function.  It also fails totally to explain the not 
unusual use of such damages in situations in which the injurer, though liable, was not 
intentionally or wantonly wrongful.  A more appropriate name for extracompensatory 
damages assessed in order to avoid underdeterrence might be “socially compensatory 
damages.”  For, while traditional compensatory damages are assessed to make the 
individual victim whole, socially compensatory damages are, in a sense, designed to 
make society whole by seeking to insure that all of the costs of harmful acts are placed on 
the liable actor. 
  Indeed, it would not be inappropriate to disaggregate the retributive and deterrence 
functions of extracompensatory damages altogether and allow separate awards to further 
the two separate goals. 
Id. at 245–46 (internal citations omitted). 
 Professor Catherine Sharkey picks up on this same idea and conceives of punitive damages as 
social compensatory damages.  See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal 
Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347 (2003). 
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IV.  THE NONCONSEQUENTIALIST/MORAL DEFENSE OF PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES AWARDED BY COMMON LAW JURIES 
To determine a rationale for punitive damages, one should at least 
consider social values, human nature, and the corrupting influence of 
market capitalism.  An ethical decision-making system that focuses on 
optimal efficiency ignores the moral implications of a traditional jury-
awarded punitive damages system.  The nonconsequentialist/ 
deontological position contends that punitive damages are expressions of 
the community’s moral outrage, that they provide the defendant with 
“just deserts,” that retribution is a proper purpose for punitive damages, 
and that corrective justice is best served when community decision 
makers focus on the return of ill-gotten profits and the wealth of the 
actor.129  This position considers the proper uses of law, human nature, 
the value of freedom, the corrupting effect of market capitalism, and 
studies in criminal justice and the punishment of corporate criminals.  In 
addition, international perspectives on the integrity of American markets 
and the metaethical nature of any punitive damage award help us 
understand why the jury rather than the judge is a superior decision 
maker. 
A. Human Nature, Societal Values, and the Free Market 
The first step in defending jury-awarded punitive damages from a 
nonconsequentialist/deontological perspective is to rediscover the beliefs 
and values that undergird U.S. law, both criminal and civil.  Our law has 
“Reformed Protestant” roots—civil (as opposed to religious) law is used 
to restrain persons from sinful conduct.130  To induce compliance, the 
law should accord with the public’s moral ideals.131  Witte and Arthur 
argue “that criminal law and punishment must induce respect for formal 
law and social norms, confirm moral inhibitions and habits of citizens, 
and shape the framework of moral education.”132  Similarly, when 
contemporary jurists abandon the moral base of the law, they lose a 
                                                     
 129. See generally Edward L. Rubin, The Incidence, Scope, and Purpose of Punitive Damages: 
Reconceptualizing the Runcible Remedies of Common Law, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 131. 
 130. Witte & Arthur, supra note 4, at 436.  John Calvin wrote, “to check the raging and 
otherwise limitlessly ranging lusts of the flesh. . . .  Hindered by fright or shame, [persons] dare 
neither execute what they have conceived in their minds, nor openly breathe forth the rage of their 
lust.”  Id. at 437. 
 131. See id. (“Threatened by divine sanctions, persons obey the basic commandments of the 
moral law.”). 
 132. Id. at 459–60 (internal quotations omitted). 
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“vital source of unity and integration.”133  Failure to punish wrongdoers 
according to social values demoralizes the public and weakens its faith in 
the law.134 
Contemporary tort law retains moral focus by including a “corrective 
justice,” function.135  The corrective justice, nonconsequentialist/ 
deontological argument is based, in part, on definitions of “just desert,” 
or the common understanding of the phrase “retribution for the 
reprehensible.”136  It holds that jury-awarded punitive damages are 
justified because they are essential in counteracting the inherently 
survivalist component of human nature—that part of our nature that 
values one’s own life (or one’s own pocketbook) over the life (or 
pocketbook) of another.  The goal is to eliminate the ill-gotten profit 
derived from harming others.  Free society requires strict rules—rules 
that are publicized and consistently upheld—to curtail the excesses of 
market capitalism that result from human nature.137  Punitive damages 
are part of this system. 
Punitive damages are also necessary to defeat a creeping 
“corporatism” that continually threatens to corrupt any governmental 
body charged with making ethical decisions.  Corporatism, or “statism,” 
is the word for the system of government most common in Europe: a 
parliamentary or unitary government.138  This system is far more efficient 
than our own.  It is less individualized, cumbersome, and emotional.139  
Under this form of government there is regularized public law 
participation in which a stable, elite cadre of technically qualified interest 
group representatives consults regularly with government officials and 
                                                     
 133. Id. at 461. 
 134. Id. at 464. 
 135. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 554–60 
(1972).  See generally JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 361 (1992) (arguing generally that 
tort law serves a rectification function in repairing wrongful losses and annulling wrongful gains); 
Ernest Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992) (supporting a formalist theory of 
corrective justice by drawing on Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel to establish a system of interpersonal 
rights and duties); Ernest Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407 (1987) 
(same). 
 136. Robinson & Darley, supra note 4, at 478.  The authors explain that people follow the law 
for a variety of reasons.  They argue that, most of all, people obey the law because they fear 
disapproval by their social groups and because they generally see themselves as moral beings.  Id. at 
468.  See also BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 130 (1985) (warning 
that distinctions in definition are often driven by deeply held differences in value). 
 137. Robinson & Darley, supra note 4, at 478. 
 138. Frank B. Cross, America the Adversarial, 89 VA. L. REV. 189, 214 (2003) (reviewing 
ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001)). 
 139. Id. at 212–17. 
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serves on influential policy-recommending committees.140  Creeping 
corporatism stands opposed to our “adversarial legalism,” where 
individuals argue issues in courts and are subject to the radical 
democracy of the common law jury.141 
The U.S. adversarial system embodies a number of values and 
beliefs that challenge the European need for order and decorum.  It 
places less value on efficiency and more on individual justice.  In the 
United States, individual justice is tied to history and a number of shared, 
fundamental, and interconnected beliefs about the nature of 
humankind.142  Instead of starting from the position that individuals are 
rational, our jurisprudence assumes that, while governments and 
established religions tend toward oppression and corruption, human 
nature also is flawed, sinful, and prone to greed and avarice.143  The 
United States, as a whole, fears centralized power, both from 
governments and institutions.144  We prefer power to be separated and the 
public to have a say in the formation and application of the law.  We 
distrust the so-called experts.  We would rather sacrifice money and 
efficiency to ensure justice and fairness for the individual. 
The U.S. view of human nature and human freedom corresponds 
with a desire to hold individuals and groups accountable when they break 
rules.  Citizens realize that market capitalism can produce temptation and 
greed.  The modern market says, “Greed is good.”145  “Greed in all its 
forms . . . has marked the upward surge of mankind.”146  Our adversarial 
legalism would rather rely on punishment after the fact than a large 
regulatory state designed to prevent harm in the first place.147  Beliefs in 
the penultimate nature of human freedom and the inevitability of human 
failing lead to a system in constant tension.148  The primary values of the 
United States are inherently conflicted—freedom to pursue happiness 
 
                                                     
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Bernard Bailyn, The Central Themes of the American Revolution, in ESSAYS ON THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 9–10 (Stephen G. Kurtz & James H. Hutson eds., 1973). 
 143. These are values derived from a mix of four views: Puritan, Evangelical, Enlightened, and 
Republican.  JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 23–35 
(2d ed. 2005). 
 144. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3 (2001); 
WITTE, supra note 143, at 23–35. 
 145. WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987). 
 146. Id. 
 147. See KAGAN, supra note 144, at 3 (noting that policymaking is principally implemented by 
“lawyer-dominated litigation”). 
 148. Cross, supra note 138, at 190, 206–30. 
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and freedom from harm, especially in an environment of scarce 
resources.149 
Corporate law pours gasoline on the fire of human nature.  It 
divorces the individual from liability for his actions by allowing limited 
liability.150  By creating a board or a committee, individuals can take 
risks with other people’s money and protect themselves through the 
invention of shared ownership.151  The market rewards risk takers.  
Limited liability makes it easier to take risks—committees shield the risk 
taker from responsibility for any decision that recklessly endangers 
another.  In this environment, risks can be taken with virtual impunity. 
Corporatism does not contain any inherent protection against the 
abuse of power.152  Unchecked, powerful corporate actors can persuade 
legislators and judges to protect corporate interests.153  Unchecked, 
corporatism will eviscerate the rule of law, destroy the integrity of the 
markets, and make impossible a free and just society. 
Sociological studies provide support for the proposition that 
corporate actors are largely undeterred by government fines.154  The 
market’s emphasis on material gain causes many of its actors to see their 
decisions in terms of the risks, rewards, and probabilities of getting 
caught, instead of in terms of right and wrong.  At some point, the law 
must send a clear message about what is right and wrong to counteract 
the immorality of the market.  The nonconsequentialist argues that 
punitive damages express social norms—that punitive damages “are 
perhaps the most important instrument in the legal repertoire for 
pronouncing moral disapproval of economically formidable 
offenders.”155  They discipline the market actor who fails to adequately 
respect an individual’s freedom from harm.  They demand compliance, 
                                                     
 149. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 74–76 (1978). 
 150. See LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY, MATERIALS AND 
PROBLEMS 326–29 (4th ed. 1998) (discussing limited liability generally). 
 151. See id. (discussing the scope of the corporate veil). 
 152. Cross, supra note 138, at 226 (arguing against European corporatism and arguing that the 
United States should continue to bear less than optimal efficiency in its civil justice system—lengthy 
discovery, juries, punitive damages—because these mechanisms prevent government officials and 
corporations from forming alliances that harm society). 
 153. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (describing how large, powerful interests 
tend to succeed in court); Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who Wins on Appeal?  
Upperdogs and Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 235 (1992) 
(reporting that large enterprises are much more successful in appellate court than individuals). 
 154. Coffee, supra note 4, at 426–31.  See also Robinson & Darley, supra note 4, at 480 
(discussing the ineffectiveness of such sanctions). 
 155. Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 
AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1428 (1993). 
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regardless of their effect on the defendant or their relationship to the 
plaintiff’s injury.156 
B. Criminal Justice Scholarship 
Jury-awarded punitive damages often seek to punish the intentional 
and malicious wrongdoer wrapped in institutional garb.  Criminal law 
does the same.  Does this mean that giving juries a free hand to punish 
such institutions really produces more compliance with the law than 
judge-made decisions that are economically efficient or utility based?  
Criminal scholars have asked this question to discern the best way to 
prevent corporate crime.  John Collins Coffee, Jr., reviewed the data 
available in 1980 and found support for his deontological belief that 
there is a need for retribution-based, rather than economically driven, 
fines.157  He concluded that, 
 The threat counts more than the penalty.  In order to determine the 
deterrent effect of a legal sanction in a world of uncertainty, one must 
consider the entire range of outcomes with which the offender was 
threatened, not simply the penalty imposed. . . . 
 . . . [F]ines will generally lack the deterrent value of incarceration 
because the range of the threatened sanction in the case of 
imprisonment typically exceeds that of fines. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . Criminal justice reforms must take into account the problem of 
demoralization costs.  A system that fines the rich and jails the poor 
risks the appearance of institutionalizing bias, and its asserted 
efficiency may depend on myopic social cost accounting. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . Even if the neo-classic assumption that a firm will always profit 
maximize is accepted, the prospects are not encouraging for achieving 
adequate corporate deterrence through reliance on penalties aimed 
solely at the firm.  Under such a theory the penalty must be increased to 
a point which, after discounting it by the likelihood of apprehension, it 
still exceeds the expected gain.  Corporate crime tends to be uniquely 
concealable and hence apprehension rates may often fall well below 
10%.  If this occurs, the penalty would have to be tenfold greater than 
the gain in order to be effective.158 
                                                     
 156. See Rubin, supra note 129, at 132 (arguing that punitive damages “have nothing to do with 
punishment, but represent an ordinary and essential mechanism for the private enforcement of 
commercial law”). 
 157. See generally Coffee, supra note 4. 
 158. Id. at 468–71. 
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Moreover, the data suggest that, to be effective, the potential penalty 
is dependent on its indeterminate range; a range that needs to be at least 
tenfold the expected gain for a penalty to be effective.159 
In the civil context, as part of the “criminal process as a whole,” 
jury-awarded punitive damages provide a clear message of moral 
condemnation, especially if the jury can truly “hurt” the defendant by 
judging reprehensibility in relation to wealth.  We need full moral 
condemnation because our political and market structures send mixed 
messages about what is right and wrong.  To combat this tendency to 
favor profit over people, tort law provides counter-incentives.  It 
punishes by requiring the disgorgement of profits in proportion to the 
wealth of the actor.160  Criminal justice scholars contend that punishment 
must take into account the wealth of the actor.161  Even if one uses an 
economic analysis of punishment in the criminal context, high punitive 
damages that vary with the wealth of the corporate actor are the bedrock 
of deterrence. 
Efforts to develop an economic understanding of criminal sanctions 
and penalties are not new.  Since the 1970s, the Chicago School of 
Economics162 has attempted to define the costs for efficient punishment 
as “the sum of damages, costs of apprehension and conviction, and costs 
of carrying out the punishments imposed.”163  Proponents of the Chicago 
School believe it is cheaper to apprehend a few criminals, and subject 
them to severe punishment, than to achieve a higher rate of apprehension 
and punish moderately.164  Proponents also find that “the harmful effects 
of some crimes may be less than the enforcement costs necessary to deter 
                                                     
 159. See id. at 466 (suggesting that the offenders’ attitudes toward risk are important for judging 
the effectiveness of potential penalty). 
 160. See Galanter & Luban, supra note 155, at 1428 (noting that punitive damages are “the most 
important instrument . . . for pronouncing moral disapproval of economically formidable 
offenders”); see also Jennifer K. Robbennolt et al., Symbolism and Incommensurability in Civil 
Sanctioning: Decision Makers as Goal Managers, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1140 (2003) (reviewing 
arguments based on equity theories).  While large punitive damages can put a company out of 
business and, therefore, lead to lay-offs, this is not a justification for allowing a company to interfere 
with an individual’s freedom from harm.  Furthermore, innocent employees with valuable skills can 
find new jobs.  Former Arthur Andersen accountants who lost their jobs as a result of the Enron 
scandal are prime examples. 
 161. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 65 (1976) (noting 
that determining optimal fines based on harm to society rather than an offender’s income has been 
criticized). 
 162. The Chicago School describes the rise of economic analysis as a tool for limiting the 
government to proven cost-benefit supported tasks that are optimally efficient.  See Coffee, supra 
note 4, at 420–21 (discussing the economic model developed by Gary Becker). 
 163. BECKER, supra note 161, at 77. 
 164. Coffee, supra note 4, at 421. 
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them.”165  These conclusions are based on the following assumptions: 
“(1) the threat of incarceration typically will have a greater deterrent 
value than the threat of a fine; (2) more deterrence is generated by 
penalties focused on an individual than on an organization; and, (3) the 
certainty of a sanction is . . . more important than its severity.”166 
Some theorists believe that economic sanctions are ineffective in 
preventing white collar crime unless the judicial system considers the 
wealth of the offending individual or entity.  Recognizing that the most 
effective deterrent is incarceration, these theorists propose a system that 
converts incarceration time into a monetary equivalent, according to the 
wealth of the offending individual or entity.167  The benefit of using 
economic sanctions in the civil context is clear—fines have been proven 
to be as effective a deterrent as incarceration, and fines are cheaper to 
administer.168  Unless the wealth of the offender is considered, however, 
the deterrent effect is hindered.169 
Furthermore, if the penalty is capped, the deterrent effect is lessened.  
Fines are most effective when they are high and unpredictable.  If fines 
are set at a certain level, a company will decide whether the benefits of 
the unlawful behavior outweigh the chances of being fined.  This is 
precisely the type of calculus that the law should prevent.  To encourage 
compliance with the law and to promote ethical business decisions, fines 
must be high and also uncertain. 
                                                     
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 422–23. 
 167. Posner agrees, with qualifications: 
But this is not to say that a system of fines discriminates against the poor.  It is rather that 
a uniform prison term discriminates against the rich compared with a uniform fine.  If we 
want to discriminate against the rich through a fine system, that is easily done by 
progressively varying the fine with the offender’s income.  If we want not to discriminate 
against the rich through an imprisonment system, we can make the length of the sentence 
inverse to the offender’s income.  In either case the choice to discriminate is independent 
of the form of the punishment. 
Posner, supra note 4, at 415. 
 Posner notes that Jeremy Bentham was the first to make this point: “‘Pecuniary punishments 
should always be regulated by the fortune of the offender.  The relative amount of the fine should be 
fixed, not its absolute amount.’”  Id. at 415 n.17 (quoting J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LITIGATION 
217 (1975)). 
 168. See id. at 410 (“[F]ining the affluent offender is preferable to imprisoning him from 
society’s standpoint because it is less costly and no less efficacious.”).  Criminal punishment 
scholars are quick to point out that an objective utility analysis will do little to deter a criminal actor.  
In this regard, attitudes concerning morality play a strong role and social sanctions or the fulfillment 
of moral obligations are actually a better deterrent of crime than a utility analysis.  Robinson & 
Darley, supra note 4, at 468–71. 
 169. See Posner, supra note 4, at 415 (suggesting a progressive scale for fines based on income). 
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In the end, even without caps, criminal justice scholars contend there 
is little deterrence from economic sanctions.170  Corporations as entities 
cannot be deterred—punishment only deters the individuals who run 
corporations.  Yet prosecutors struggle to prove who in an organization is 
responsible for wrongdoing.  Further, corporate assets can be sent abroad 
or hidden in off-shore bank accounts.171  Collection is low compared to 
the individual actor’s ability to pay.172  Generally, the expected gains to 
the company and the individual are greater than the risk of punishment to 
any one individual.173  In addition, the costs of punishment are absorbed 
by passing them on to future consumers.174  In other words, corporations 
have an economic incentive to maximize profits by breaking the law.  As 
it stands, punitive damages are the only force capable of constraining 
corporate greed and the only manifestation of the law capable of 
expressing moral condemnation.  The educative use of punitive damages 
may be its most important; it teaches that greed at the expense of 
harming others is wrong and immoral. 
C. International Comparative Law Provides Support for Punitive 
Damages 
In addition, international law perspectives demonstrate the need and 
role for punitive damages on a national and international scale.  Some 
countries have laws limiting judgments against their citizens to 
compensatory damages.175  There is little to prevent such countries from 
exporting defective products to the United States.  Without the threat of 
punitive damages, these countries are free to balance expected profits 
against the amount of damage their products will cause. 
                                                     
 170. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 436 (“The threat of incarceration would have a greater deterrent 
value than the threat of fines even if the authorized ceilings on fines were infinitely high.”).  Where 
institutions act to defraud the public, Congress gives the whistle-blower the right to recover, not 
based on their harm but on the amount of ill-gotten gains.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2000) (basing the 
award in a false claims qui tam action on the amount of recovery). 
 171. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 437 (suggesting that individuals “can hide assets . . . [or] 
shelter [them]”). 
 172. See id. (discussing the “collectability boundary”). 
 173. See id. at 456 (“A distinctive feature of organizational crime is that it is committed by 
agents for the primary benefit of a principal.”). 
 174. See id. at 443 (stating that Section 5 of the Model Business Corporation Act permits fines to 
be indemnified in some cases). 
 175. See e.g., Lucien J. Dhooge, The Lowen Group v. United States: Punitive Damages and the 
Foreign Investment Provisions of the North America Free Trade Agreement, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 
495, 566 (2004) (describing limits imposed by Middle East nations). 
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A timely example that illustrates the need for punitive damages in 
the international arena involves lawsuits brought by families of victims 
of terrorism.176  In these cases, judges award large compensatory and 
punitive damages.177  Some of the awards are even based on the size of 
the responsible government’s defense budget.178  These punitive damage 
awards are expressions of moral outrage—they say to the world, “this is 
what an individual’s life is worth in the United States.”  We must not 
allow foreign governments to engage in their own calculus, weighing the 
value of human life against a desire to expand their territory, spread their 
religious views, or fulfill their gods’ wills. 
Some commentators note that punitive damages in international law 
are necessary for the effective enforcement of human rights.179  These 
punitive damages give governments legitimacy by empowering their 
courts to protect individuals from the collective power of the state and 
powerful international corporate actors.  In any event, the perspective of 
international market actors highlights the values underlying jury-awarded 
punitive damages.  Punitive damage awards express the values of the 
U.S. citizenry—freedom from harm above freedom to thrive.  Allowing 
uncapped punitive damages in international law is an important way for 
countries such as the United States to uphold their values in the 
international market and to protect their citizens according to their ethical 
standards.  Proponents of unrestrained punitive damage awards 
acknowledge that, given proper circumstances (work pressure and a lack 
of accountability), there are powerful forces leading individuals to value 
their own needs over the safety of others.  These forces are universal.  
Proponents understand that punitive damages are currently the only line 
of defense against the forces of human nature. 
D. The Jury 
Implicit in Justice Stevens’s opinion in Cooper180 and Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion in State Farm181 is a diminution in the role of the 
                                                     
 176. See W. Michael Reisman & Monica Hakimi, Illusion and Reality in the Compensation of 
Victims of International Terrorism, 54 ALA. L. REV. 561, 568–74 (2003) (discussing cases against 
Cuba and Iran). 
 177. See id. at 568–73 (detailing several judgments that exceeded $100 million). 
 178. See id. at 574 (discussing the Secretary of the Treasury’s power to distribute funds “not to 
exceed the total amount in the Iran Foreign Military Sales Program account”). 
 179. See Reisman & Hakimi, supra note 176, at 569 (citing Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 966 
F. Supp. 1239, 1251 (1997)). 
 180. See supra notes 32–40 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra notes 41–66 and accompanying text. 
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jury.182  These decisions suggest that judges make better, more rational 
decisions than juries.  In reality, juries are separate, radical, and moral 
discipliners of the market. 
Lost in the Court’s discussion of the rationality of optimal deterrence 
and retribution is an explanation of why a judge is any better at 
determining the level of punishment deserved by a corporate defendant 
than a jury.  Judges themselves must recognize the irrational features of 
fact finding.  Both the making of law by judges and the finding of facts 
by juries require that consequentialist directives be processed within 
nonconsequentialist decision-making constraints.  As such, both 
processes are subject to inconsistent methods and uses.  Where their 
directives are consequentualist, these processes are open to criticism for 
lack of definiteness, as each tries to define the good that their principles 
will produce.  They are also unable to prove or guarantee their future 
good from the use of their principles.  Where each has processing 
constraints that are dogmatic and nonconsequentialist, the systems are 
open to criticism for producing inconsistent and unpredictable results 
that do not further society’s widely held beliefs concerning what is in 
people’s best interests.  The criticisms illustrate the lack of rational 
justification for the assumptions that undergird these systems processing 
directives. 
As philosophers have long pointed out, these criticisms are not 
unique to the tort system but exist in any normative, ethical, decision-
making system.183  Perhaps, however, the tort system, which must try to 
operate within the adjudicatory constraints imposed by the real world, is 
driven, for the sake of appearances, to pretend that the criticisms are 
invalid.  It is interesting to note that what the economic system tries to do 
is what modern philosophers argue is the best way to solve the 
inconsistencies of consequentialist and nonconsequentialist systems.184  
These philosophers argue that the key to a unified and consistent system 
is wide acceptance of the underlying faith in the tenets and assumptions 
                                                     
 182. See cases cited supra note 67, and accompanying text.  These cases evidence a gradual 
eroding of the role of the jury in civil law decision making.  A number of states have recently placed 
limits on punitive damages.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (Supp. 1990) (capping punitive 
damages at $250,000); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (1987) (capping punitive damages at $350,000).  
Some of the caps place flat dollar limits on the amount of the award, while others restrict punitive 
damages to some multiple (e.g., two or three times) of compensatory damages.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE 
§ 6-11-21 (flat cap); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72 (West Supp. 1990) (capping damages at a three-to-
one ratio). 
 183. See generally CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 149 (discussing choices that members of 
society must make in the allocation of scarce goods). 
 184. See REGAN, supra note 79, ch. 8 (introducing the theory of “co-operative utilitarianism”). 
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of an ethical system.185  Once an agreement is reached among all the 
participants in such systems, and a process for consistent decision 
making is found, those who agree with both the principles of the system 
and with its process will be satisfied with the consistency, definiteness, 
and completeness of their system.186  Yet, there is no more agreement 
among judges than among individual jurors in a jury.187  All things being 
equal, the jury is a better judge of the changing values and morals of 
society. 
The genius of the jury system is that it provides for decision making 
that is at once democratic and uniquely private.  In deliberation, jurors 
must listen to one another and strive for consensus.  Nowhere else in our 
democratic system can one individual prevent the majority from taking 
action.  During this process, jurors are untouchable—no influence 
beyond their own values and beliefs may persuade this group to reach a 
particular conclusion.  Once jurors emerge from deliberation, their job is 
complete.  No one can ask for their reasons or force them to change their 
decision.  Judges are entirely different.  They are undemocratic.  They do 
not have to listen to anyone else in making a decision.  However, they 
are subject to outside forces because their decisions must be explained, 
and such explanations are often questioned and occasionally overturned. 
Where a decision’s rationale is mixed and uncertain, the decision is 
ideal for a jury.  Punitive damages are said to be about deterrence, 
corrective justice, and compliance.  More than just deterrence, punitive 
damages are about punishment—about judging the reprehensibility of an 
action and expressing the moral outrage of society.  Jury decisions are 
still restrained by the Constitution.  They must be proportional to some 
combination of compensation, wealth of the individual, and 
                                                     
 185. See id. at 130 (“[T]he more relevant correct beliefs the parties have, the more sophisticated 
is their co-operation.”). 
 186. See Cross, supra note 138, at 230 (noting that adversarial legalism can serve as a 
moderating check on all branches of government). 
 187. To decide which is a better decision maker, judge or jury, one may ask whether, in light of 
State Farm, a principled basis has developed governing when federal and state courts permit 
punitive damages that exceed the ten-to-one ratio.  Of course, State Farm itself held that there is no 
rigid benchmark on ratios and that ratios that are greater than four to one or ten to one may comport 
with due process. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).  This is 
possible where a “particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic 
damages.”  Id. (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996)).  Furthermore, a 
higher ratio might be necessary where the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of 
noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine.  Id.  On the contrary, when compensatory 
damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach 
the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.  Id.  For a discussion of case law applying State 
Farm, consult Part VI. 
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blameworthiness of the actor.  They cannot be clearly excessive.188  They 
must be based on the defendant’s conduct as it relates to individuals 
within the court’s jurisdiction.189 
Who better than a group of twelve diverse Americans to determine 
what value society places on freedom from harm?  A jury is a preferred 
decision maker precisely because the moral and religious values that go 
into the decision are shielded by the process.  In this unanimous, 
unquestionable decision, the community, through these jurors, is given 
the ability to fight back, the ability to speak directly to corporate actors in 
a language they understand—dollars and cents. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While optimal, efficient deterrence provides a powerful justification 
for awarding damages, punitive damages, as developed in common law 
torts cases, have a moral foundation or purpose that is broader than the 
utilitarian roots of deterrence.190  Punitive damages must be understood 
in connection with their corrective-justice roots.  Such roots are not only 
concerned with compensating the individual but also with compensating 
society for the threat to all people’s freedom.  These concerns are 
ignored by imposing a cap, either a maximum amount or a single-digit 
multiplier.  Under the existing system, market forces encourage 
corporate actors to make illegal and unethical decisions if the expected 
profit is ten times larger than the harm to those who will be injured and 
obtain a judgment.  When expected profits exceed these expected costs, 
the decision to engage in undesirable conduct is a smart economic move.  
Analysis of the moral and philosophical uses of U.S. common law 
demonstrates why a narrowly focused deterrence model that centers on 
harm to a particular plaintiff, rather than on reprehensibility and moral 
outrage, will undermine democratic values. 
The Supreme Court has moved significantly the rationale of punitive 
damages away from its moral basis in retribution and corrective justice to 
an apparently consequentialist rationale.  This shift is contrary to the 
values and beliefs imbedded in American culture: that freedom from 
harm is primary, that institutions are corruptible, that power should be 
separated, and that humans are sometimes irrational.  Punishing and 
                                                     
 188. Paul J. Zwier, Due Process and Punitive Damages, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 407, 441–42. 
 189. Gore, 517 U.S. at 610. 
 190. See Gary T. Schwartz, Comment, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of 
Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 140–43 (1982) (arguing that deterrence cannot explain 
punitive damages). 
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preventing bad corporate behavior is a difficult task.  Effective 
punishment depends on sending a message of moral condemnation and 
economic pain, especially where the market blurs the lines of morality 
and values profit above all else.  Where the institutional conduct is 
particularly egregious, the most effective way to punish in civil law is to 
simulate incarceration.  In some ways, bankruptcy, which limits a 
company’s freedom and taints its reputation, serves this purpose. 
An international perspective adds force to the nonconsequentialist 
argument that the importance of individual freedom and liberty supports 
jury-awarded punitive damages.  Each society values the individual 
according to its own own beliefs.  Some believe that a cause, or a 
religion, is more important than the value of human life.  Some believe 
that the collective good takes precedence over an individual’s happiness.  
Upholding punitive damages in international law is a way for each 
society to maintain its values in the global arena. 
In the United States, the jury system provides the best mechanism for 
determining fair punishment.  The nature of the punitive damages award 
is complex, requiring value judgments and speculation about future 
consequences.  Local jurors are in a position to express the values of 
their community through a unanimous, independent decision.  Placing 
this decision in the hands of judges threatens the corrective justice 
system and the integrity of the market. 
VI. APPENDIX 
Many courts read State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Campbell191 as imposing a ten-to-one ceiling on constitutionally 
permissible punitive damage awards.  These courts reduce punitive 
damage awards that exceed the single-digit ratio margin.  For example, 
in Valu Gas, Inc. v. Equilon Enterprises,192 the California Court of 
Appeals held a ratio of twelve to one was excessive.  The court found the 
defendant’s fraudulent conduct reprehensible, but the punitive-to-
compensatory ratio was above that permitted by State Farm.193 
Other courts construing State Farm are more cautious.  For example, 
the Eighth Circuit explains that a ratio greater than ten to one does not 
 
                                                     
 191. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 192. No. B169365, 2005 WL 950133, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2005). 
 193. Id. 
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violate the Constitution but rather alerts the court that such an award 
needs special justifications.194 
Following this cautionary view, some lower courts have upheld 
punitive damages that are well above the single-digit margin.  For 
example, in Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc.,195 the court upheld 
punitive damages in a ratio of approximately thirty-seven to one against 
a motel that subjected its guests to an infestation of bedbugs.  The court 
stated that the motel management willfully ignored the insect infestation 
and showed wanton conduct deserving of punitive damages.196  The 
jury’s verdict of $186,000 in punitive damages and $5000 in 
compensatory damages was upheld by the court.197 
In a notable state court case, Craig v. Holsey,198 the Georgia Court of 
Appeals let stand a punitive damage ratio of twenty-two to one.  In that 
case, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident caused by the 
defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol and 
marijuana.199  The court noted that the defendant was on probation for 
another offense at the time of the accident and that he continued to drive 
under the influence of alcohol and drugs even after the accident giving 
rise to the case.200 
Some courts have upheld even higher ratios in nonphysical injury 
cases.  For example, in Kemp v. American Telephone & Telegraph 
Co.,201 a RICO class action by telephone customers who were billed 
illegally for fees they incurred using a telephone gambling service, the 
court allowed compensatory damages of $115 and remitted punitive 
damages to $250,000, a ratio of 2173 to 1.  In Planned Parenthood v. 
American Coalition of Life Activists,202 the district court upheld a ratio of 
thirty-two to one.  In that case, abortion providers sued anti-abortion 
activists under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act.203  The 
district court found that the defendants who placed the plaintiffs’ 
 
                                                     
 194. See Williams v. Conagra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 799 (8th Cir. 2004) (“In the absence of 
extremely reprehensible conduct against a plaintiff or some special circumstance such as an 
extraordinary small compensatory award, awards in excess of 10-to-1 cannot stand.”). 
 195. 347 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 196. Id. at 675. 
 197. Id. at 678. 
 198. 590 S.E.2d 742, 748 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). 
 199. Id. at 744. 
 200. Id. at 747. 
 201. 393 F.3d 1354, 1365 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 202. 300 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1060 (D. Or. 2004). 
 203. Id. at 1057. 
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identities on a Web site placed the plaintiffs in danger of physical 
violence.204 
In Stack v. Jaffee,205 the district court held that the intentional failure 
to investigate charges of police misconduct warranted punitive damages 
of $27,000 even though compensatory damages were only $2000. 
In Jones v. Rent-A-Center Inc.,206 the district court permitted 
$290,000 in punitive damages and $10,000 in compensatory damages.  
The case involved a sexual harassment action under Title VII.207  The 
jury had originally given a verdict of $10,000 in compensatory damages 
and $1.2 million in punitive damages, but the award was reduced after a 
statutory cap was applied.208  Nevertheless, the ratio in Jones was 
twenty-nine to one.209 
In addition, courts have not hesitated to permit ratios that are well 
above the single-digit ratio margin in cases where the jury has awarded 
only nominal compensatory damages.  Many of these cases involve 
infringement of civil rights or are cases where the plaintiff does not seek 
compensatory damages.  These courts tend to view the conduct of a 
defendant who violates the plaintiff’s constitutional rights as 
reprehensible and the invasion of the plaintiff’s rights as substantial.  In 
such cases, where the harm cannot be reduced to a compensable dollar 
amount, juries often award one dollar as nominal damages.  Punitive 
damages have been awarded as the only practical remedy to the plaintiff 
and as the only means of punishing and deterring the defendant.  For this 
reason, lower courts have permitted high punitive damages to serve the 
purposes of punishment and deterrence. 
For example, in Lincoln v. Case,210 the district court allowed a 
punitive damage award of $55,000, a 110-to-1 ratio to the compensatory 
damages, where a prospective tenant sued a landlord under the Fair 
Housing Act for race discrimination.  In Sherman v. Kasotakis,211 the 
district court upheld a punitive damage award of $12,500 where the 
African-American defendants were racially discriminated against in a 
restaurant and called derogatory names.  The district court stated that the 
ratio limitation did not apply to cases where nominal damages were 
                                                     
 204. Id. at 1058–59. 
 205. 306 F. Supp. 2d 137, 142 (D. Conn. 2003). 
 206. 281 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1290 (D. Kan. 2003). 
 207. Id. at 1280. 
 208. Id. at 1279. 
 209. Id. at 1289. 
 210. 340 F.3d 283, 285 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 211. 314 F. Supp. 2d 843, 873 (N.D. Iowa 2004). 
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available instead of compensatory damages because a proportional 
punitive damage award did not punish or deter the defendant in any 
way.212  The court stated that a 12,500-to-1 ratio was reasonable and 
permissible in consideration of the facts of the case.213 
Courts also have allowed a high ratio of punitive-to-nominal 
damages where a plaintiff does not seek compensatory damages or where 
the compensatory damages are insignificant in comparison with the 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.  For example, in Tyco 
International, Inc. v. John Does, 1–3,214 the district court upheld a 
10,000-to-1, punitive-to-nominal damage ratio.  In that case, individuals 
launched an unsuccessful spam attack on Tyco’s computers with the 
intention of making the computers crash.215  The district court affirmed 
the magistrate’s recommendation of $1 in nominal damages and $10,000 
in punitive damages as being necessary to punish the defendant because 
Tyco did not ask for compensable damages in its complaint.216 
Tate v. Dragovich,217 involved a suit by a state prisoner against 
prison employees for harassment.  In that case, the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act prohibited recovery of compensatory damages, so the jury 
awarded the plaintiff $1 in nominal damages and $10,000 in punitive 
damages.218  The Court held that the punitive damage award was 
reasonable and permissible.219  Furthermore, nominal damages are not 
necessarily one-dollar awards.  For example, in Williams v. Kaufman 
County,220 the court stated that nominal damages did not fit the ratio 
limitation and that nominal damages ranging between $500 and $5000 
were permitted. 
Finally, other courts have upheld high punitive damages when they 
believed that the punitive damages were only a fraction of the potential 
damages.  For example, in Craig v. Holsey,221 where a drunk driver was 
liable for injuries caused in an auto accident, the court upheld a punitive 
damage award of $200,000, even though the compensatory damage 
award was $8801.  The court stated that “Holsey could have died as a 
result of Craig’s driving under the influence” and that “awards for 
                                                     
 212. Id. at 875. 
 213. Id. at 876. 
 214. No. 01 Civ. 3856(RCC)(DF), 2003 WL 23374767, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2003). 
 215. Id. at *3–4. 
 216. Id. 
 217. No. CIV.A.96-4495, 2003 WL 21978141, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2003). 
 218. Id. at *9. 
 219. Id. at *10. 
 220. 352 F.3d 994, 1015 n.70 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 221. 590 S.E.2d 742, 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). 
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wrongful death can easily approach or exceed the amount of punitive 
damages awarded in the present case.”222 
In the last two years, courts have looked to State Farm for direction 
on when punitive damages are grossly excessive and in violation of due 
process.  Outcomes indicate that unusually large punitive damages are 
likely to be reduced.  However, some lower courts distinguish their cases 
from State Farm and permit high punitive damage awards.  These cases 
involve claims where the egregious conduct of a defendant results in 
nominal, as opposed to compensatory damages, and where the potential 
harm to the plaintiff is difficult to quantify.  In these cases, lower courts 
permit punitive damage awards that result in ratios well outside the 
single-digit margin.  Nevertheless, a principal basis governing when 
lower federal courts will permit high punitive damages is not apparent 
because some courts also allow high punitive damages in cases that do 
involve compensatory damages. 
Lower courts vary significantly in their application of the State Farm 
factors for determining reprehensibility.  Some courts apply the factors 
broadly and others apply them narrowly.  As a result, there does not 
appear to be any uniform treatment of the reprehensibility issue.  What 
appears to be happening is a mere substitution of the jury-decided verdict 
with a judge-decided order of what conduct is reprehensible and how 
reprehensible it is.  The wide variation in the application of the factors 
makes it very difficult to determine when an action is sufficiently 
egregious to warrant a high punitive damage award. 
Does retribution provide a principled basis for large punitive 
damages?  It is important to remember that punitive damages are aimed 
at deterrence and retribution.223  However, due process prohibits the 
imposition of grossly excessive punitive damages because excessive 
amounts do not further any legitimate purpose and constitute an arbitrary 
deprivation of property.224 
Courts must consider the following guideposts when reviewing the 
reasonableness of a punitive damage award: 
(1)  the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; 
(2)  the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the 
plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and 
(3)  the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury 
                                                     
 222. Id. at 748. 
 223. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (“Punitive damages may 
properly be . . . imposed . . . in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.”). 
 224. Id. at 586. 
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and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable 
cases.225 
The most important of the guideposts is the degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.226  Because there is a 
presumption that compensatory damages make a plaintiff whole for 
injuries suffered, punitive damages should be awarded only when the 
defendant’s conduct is so reprehensible that such an award is necessary 
for deterrence and punishment.227  The degree of reprehensibility is 
determined by considering whether: 
 
 (a) “the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic”; 
 (b) the “conduct [shows] an indifference to or a reckless disregard of 
the health and safety of others”; 
 (c) the victim of the conduct is financially vulnerable; 
 (d) “the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated 
incident”; and 
 (e) “the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, 
or mere accident.”228 
 
Even though any one of the factors may weigh in favor of a plaintiff, 
it does not necessarily sustain a punitive damage award.  The absence of 
all factors, on the other hand, makes any award suspect.229  In 
determining the reprehensibility of the defendant’s action, a court should 
only consider conduct that has a nexus to the specific harm suffered by 
the plaintiff.230  That is, a defendant should be punished for the conduct 
that harmed the plaintiff and not for acts that are independent from those 
upon which liability was premised.231  Therefore, as long as there is a 
nexus between that conduct and the specific harm suffered, lawful out-
of-state conduct may be probative when determining reprehensibility.232  
In sum, the “reprehensibility guidepost does not permit courts to expand 
 
                                                     
 225. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 
575). 
 226. Id. at 419. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 422–23. 
 232. Id. at 422. 
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the scope of the case so that a defendant may be punished for any 
malfeasance.”233 
Repeated instances of misconduct are more indicative of 
reprehensible conduct than an individual instance of malfeasance.234  
Therefore, recidivists may be punished more severely than first-time 
offenders and might warrant a higher punitive damage award.  However, 
courts must ensure that the conduct in question replicates the prior 
transgression when considering repeated instances of misconduct.235 
The goal of State Farm was to create an exacting review of the 
reasonableness of punitive damages.  However, it has not achieved this 
goal.  Lower courts vary significantly in their application of the factors.  
For example, some lower courts have immediately treated conduct that 
results in primarily economic injuries as being less reprehensible than 
conduct that results in physical injuries, even if the physical harm is 
minimal.  In one case, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld a punitive 
damage award of $500,000 against the owner of a recently purchased 
motel.236  In McCaleb, a guest struck her ankle against a piece of metal 
on the bottom of the bed frame that caused “a speck of blood,” but the 
court found the defendant’s negligence so reprehensible as to warrant the 
punitive damage award.237  On the other hand, in Eden Electrical, LTD. 
v. Amana Co.,238 the defendant intentionally and illegally ruined a small 
business through fraudulent business practices.  The district court held 
that the damages suffered by the plaintiff were purely economic and did 
not warrant the high punitive damages awarded by the jury.239 
State Farm therefore is vague enough that lower federal courts apply 
its factors broadly or narrowly.  The result is a disparate treatment of the 
issues regarding reprehensibility.  The lack of a uniform treatment shows 
that State Farm has failed in establishing some precise or predictable 
manner of reviewing the reasonableness of punitive damage awards.  
Instead, it appears that courts simply substitute the jury verdict with the 
judge’s opinion of what is reprehensible and to what degree. 
The above cases indicate that lower courts have distinguished State 
Farm in cases involving nominal damages and where the quantification 
of potential damages is difficult.  However, these cases do not provide 
                                                     
 233. Id. at 424. 
 234. Id. at 423 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 577 (1996)). 
 235. Id. (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993)). 
 236. Shiv-Rom, Inc. v. McCaleb, 892 So. 2d 299, 319 (Ala. 2004). 
 237. Id. 
 238. 258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 959–60 (N.D. Iowa 2003). 
 239. Id. at 974. 
ZWIER FINAL.DOC 4/15/2006  10:33:48 AM 
2006] THE UTILITY OF A NONCONSEQUENTIALIST RATIONALE 447 
proof that a principled basis has been established to guide lower state and 
federal courts in permitting high punitive damages.  The wide variation 
in the application of factors by the lower courts in determining 
reprehensibility makes deciphering a principled basis difficult because 
there is no uniform treatment of the issue.  Courts turn out to be no better 
than juries at measuring retribution and its effect on punitive damages. 
